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I. INTRODUCTION
As the population ages, a shift in crime is emerging. Individuals are
becoming more likely to engage in financial crime and less likely to engage
in violent crime.' According to data from the United States Sentencing
Commission ("Commission"), approximately 8,0002 individuals were
1. Gary Fields, Financial Crimes Merit More Prison, Judicial Panel Says, WALL ST. J., Apr.
26, 2001, at A4, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2861614.
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
[hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK] tbl. 3 (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
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sentenced for white-collar crimes 3 at the federal4 level in the year 2000.'
This number represents approximately thirteen percent of all defendants
sentenced for federal crimes in the year 2000.6
The Commission has been charged with the task of overseeing the
sentencing of defendants convicted of all federal crimes, including white-
collar crimes. Among the Commission's primary goals is to ensure that
convicted individuals are sentenced uniformly and with minimal disparity.7
To accomplish these goals, the Commission has created the United States
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").8 The Guidelines have been relatively
2000/SBTOCOO.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author). The total consists of 6,286
defendants sentenced for fraud offenses, 940 sentenced for embezzlement, and 769 sentenced for tax
offenses. Id.
3. White-collar crime is defined as a "nonviolent crime usu[ally] involving cheating or
dishonesty in commercial matters. Examples include fraud, embezzlement, bribery and insider
trading." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1590 (7th ed. 1999).
4. This Comment relates exclusively to white-collar crime under federal law, and sentences
imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Federal crimes are far outnumbered by state
crimes, representing approximately only five percent of state crimes. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 3 (1998), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1998/sbtoc98.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author)
(noting 50,605 convictions for federal crimes in the year 1998); U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, STATE
COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1998 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl. 1 .1 (1998) (noting an
estimated 927,717 convictions for state crimes in the year 1998), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/scsc98st.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
5. The year 2000 refers to the Commission's fiscal year ending September 30, 2000. See 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2 (Introduction).
6. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 3 (noting that 59,589 individuals were sentenced for
federal crimes in the year 2000).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2001). The statute states:
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to -
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice
system that-
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct ....
Id. (emphasis added); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) ("The goal of the
Sentencing Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjustified disparities and so [sic] reach toward the
evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of
justice.") (emphasis added).
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 (2001)
("[T]he Commission developed these guidelines as a practical effort toward the achievement of a
more honest, uniform, equitable, proportional, and therefore effective sentencing system."),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2001guid/lpta.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with
author).
effective to date in reducing sentencing disparity,9 however, disparity in
sentencing continues to exist.
This Comment discusses major sources of sentencing disparity that
continue to affect defendants of white-collar crimes despite the existence of
uniform sentencing guidelines. The focus of the Comment is to answer one
primary question: Why might a defendant convicted of white-collar crime in
one court receive a materially different sentence than he or she would have
received if convicted in another court? As will be shown, the answer has
many components.' 0
Part II of this Comment briefly discusses the history and mechanics of
the Guidelines as a backdrop for the analysis to follow." Part III discusses
twelve distinct circuit splits that contribute to disparity in white-collar
sentencing.' 2 The circuit splits result from conflicting interpretations and
application of the Guidelines by the various United States Courts of
Appeals. Part IV discusses the nature and impact of "adjustments" to
offense levels and "departures" from sentencing ranges under the
Guidelines.' 3 The discussion reveals that both significant judicial discretion
at the trial court level and the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate
review contribute to white-collar sentencing disparity. Part V addresses how
judicial discretion conferred upon judges can lead to varying terms of
imprisonment for similarly situated defendants of white-collar crimes.
14
Among the sources of disparity stemming from judicial discretion are a
judge's ability to select a sentence from anywhere within a given sentencing
range calculated under the Guidelines, and a judge's ability to impose non-
prison alternatives to physical incarceration. Part VI addresses how
prosecutorial discretion held by Assistant United States Attorneys leads to
sentencing disparity.' 5 Among the sources of disparity in this context are a
prosecutor's discretion in determining which charges to bring, discretion in
9. Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 241 (1999) (concluding that the
Guidelines have been generally effective in reducing sentencing disparity); Leslie A. Cory,
Comment, Looking at the Federal Sentencing Process One Judge at a Time, One Probation Officer
at a Time, 51 EMORY L.J. 379, 436 (2002). "As a former federal probation officer, I have observed
at close range hundreds of sentencings under both old law and the guidelines. My personal
experience is that application of the sentencing guidelines has reduced unwarranted sentencing
disparity." Id.
10. This Comment identifies some of the more prevalent sources of sentencing disparity as
identified through case law, scholarly works, and discussions with federal prosecutors. However,
this Comment does not purport to identify each and every source of sentencing disparity. Disparity
is an expansive concept not easily reduced to a complete list of contributing factors.
11. See infra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 36-209 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 210-78 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 279-321 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 322-97 and accompanying text.
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whether to seek a downward departure for "substantial assistance" provided
by defendants, and discretion in whether to seek a plea agreement. Finally,
Part VII concludes with a recommendation to the Commission to amend the
Guidelines to resolve the circuit splits, and an observation that some sources
of white-collar sentencing disparity are perhaps better left undisturbed.
6
II. HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF THE GUIDELINES
A. History of the Guidelines
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("Act") to reduce
sentencing disparity between similarly situated offenders convicted of
similar crimes. 17 In response to the Act, the Commission was formed. 8 The
Commission was assigned the task of developing uniform sentencing
guidelines for application to all federal crimes.' 9 Pursuant to this directive,
the Commission enacted the Guidelines in 1987.20 The Guidelines are a
statutory body of law binding all federal courts in the sentencing of
individuals convicted of federal crimes.2'
Under the Guidelines, although uniformity in sentencing is a goal, some
degree of customization in sentencing is permitted.2  Through various
"adjustments" to a defendant's offense level, and "departures" from a
16. See infra notes 398-410 and accompanying text.
17. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 ("[I]n enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 ... Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in
sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders."); see also supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
18. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1989) ("The Commission is a body
created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 .... ").
19. Supra note 7 and accompanying text; U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 1.
20. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 2. Aside from issues of disparity in sentencing,
major goals of the Guidelines were to increase the number of white-collar offenders spending time in
prison, and increase the average length of incarceration per white-collar offender. Mark A. Cohen,
The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for Sentencing of Economic Crimes and New
Technology Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 503, 517 (2000) (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 1). The intended
increases in sentencing of white-collar criminals have come to fruition. For example, the rate of
imprisonment for individuals convicted of white-collar crime increased from thirty-nine percent in
1984 to sixty-one percent in 1999. Id. at 517-18. The average sentence length for individuals
convicted of white-collar crime increased from fourteen months in 1984 to eighteen months in 1999.
Id.
21. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 (holding that the Guidelines are constitutional); Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (holding that the commentary following the text of the
Guidelines is constitutional).
22. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
calculated sentencing range, a sentence can be tailored to the unique
circumstances surrounding each case.23 Further, criminal history is a
significant factor contributing to customization of a sentence. 24 In addition,
the Guidelines produce a "sentencing range" rather than an exact number of
months for a sentence, and judges are allowed to select a sentence anywhere
within the applicable sentencing range. In summary, while the
Commission did seek to eliminate sentencing disparity, the Commission did
not seek an inflexible system of sentencing where all defendants convicted
of a particular statutory offense would receive the exact same sentence
regardless of the circumstances surrounding each case.26
B. Mechanics of the Guidelines
27
Calculation of a sentence under the Guidelines is a multi-step process.
First, the court must locate the statute of conviction in the Statutory Index.2 8
Then, based on a mapping scheme contained in the Statutory Index, the
court must determine which Guideline section applies.29  Next, the court
must look to the applicable Guideline section to determine the "base offense
level" for the offense of conviction.30 The base offense level is then adjusted
upward or downward for any necessary "adjustments."'" The court must
then determine the criminal history category for the defendant.32 The court
23. See infra notes 220-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 32.
25. See infra notes 282-94 and accompanying text; see also U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch: 1, pt.
A, § 2 (describing the concept of sentencing ranges). The maximum of any given sentencing range
cannot exceed the minimum of the range by more than the greater of: (i) twenty-five percent, or (ii)
six months. Id. §§ 2, 4(h) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)). Selection of a precise sentence within the
sentencing range is left to the discretion of the judge. See infra notes 282-94 and accompanying text.
26. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(a) (discussing the decision of the Commission not
to enact a purely "charge offense" system).
27. For a comprehensive discussion of the mechanics of the sentencing process explained by a
federal district court judge, see Honorable Patti B. Saris, Below The Radar Screens: Have The
Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1027, 1031-37 (1997).
28. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. A (Statutory Index).
29. Id.; see also U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 111.1(a) (providing a roadmap for applying the
Guidelines). The primary Guideline sections for white-collar offenses are: (i) Section 2B1.l, which
applies to, among other things, embezzlement and "fraud & deceit"; (ii) Section 2B1.4, which
applies to insider trading; and (iii) Section 2Tl.1, which applies to tax evasion.
30. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § IB1.l(b) (providing a roadmap for applying the Guidelines). The
Guideline sections in Chapter 2 (i.e. §§ 2A1.I - 2X5.1) state a base offense level for each statute of
conviction.
31. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § lB 1.1(c) (providing a roadmap for applying the Guidelines). For a
list of adjustments under the Guidelines, see infra note 220.
32. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § IB.l(f) (providing a roadmap for applying the Guidelines);
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 4A.LI (providing instructions for calculating the criminal history
category).
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then uses the applicable offense level and criminal history category to locate
a "sentencing range" on the Sentencing Table.33 Next, the court must
consider whether any necessary "departures" from the calculated sentencing
range should be invoked.34 Finally, once a final sentencing range is
determined, the judge must select a precise sentence within the sentencing
range.35
Due to the mechanical nature of the Guidelines, differences in the
interpretation or application of the Guidelines by different courts or judges at
any step during the sentencing process may cause sentencing disparity to
occur. The focus of this Comment now turns to specific instances of
differing interpretation and application of the Guidelines that lead to
sentencing disparity.
III. CIRCUIT SPLITS
A review of decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals reveals at
least twelve distinct circuit splits that lead to disparity in sentencing among
defendants of white-collar crimes. Many of the circuit splits relate to
sentencing in the context of all crimes, not just white-collar crimes.
However, for purposes of this Comment, the issues are discussed
specifically with an eye toward their impact on sentencing of white-collar
crimes.
33. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § IB1.l(g) (providing a roadmap for applying the Guidelines). The
Sentencing Table is located at U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. The Sentencing Table has a horizontal axis for
the offense level and a vertical axis for the criminal history category. The table is comprised of
forty-three offense levels and six criminal history categories. A sentencing range appears at the
intersection of each offense level axis and criminal history category axis. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at
ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
34. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § lB 1.1(i). For a list of grounds for departure under the Guidelines,
see infra note 238.
35. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § IBI.4. For a discussion of factors surrounding the selection of a
sentence within a sentencing range, see infra note 285. The defendant usually serves most of the
sentence imposed. Rewards for good behavior may decrease the sentence by up to fifteen percent.
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 ("[T]he abolition of parole makes the sentence imposed by
the court the sentence the offender will serve, less approximately fifteen percent for good
behavior."); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2001) (stating that a prisoner may receive up to fifty-four days of
good-time credit per year for complying with institutional regulations).
A. Case Law and the Guidelines
1. Section 1 B 1.4 - Selecting the High End of the Sentencing Range for
Refusal to Cooperate With Authorities
Once a sentencing range has been determined under the Guidelines,36 a
judge may select any point within the range to serve as the final sentence. v
Sentencing ranges on the Sentencing Table vary in size from as small as six
months to as large as eighty-one months, depending on the offense of
conviction and the defendant's criminal history category.38 Thus, a judge's
decision of which point to select within the sentencing range has a
significant impact on the ultimate sentence imposed.
In deciding the ultimate sentence to impose within a sentencing range,
judges have a great deal of discretion and may consider a variety of factors. 9
While the list of factors available for consideration is quite expansive, at
least one court of appeals has attempted to limit those factors. In doing so, a
circuit split has evolved.40
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that sentencing
judges are prohibited from using a defendant's failure to cooperate with
authorities as a basis for selecting a sentence at the high end of the
sentencing range. 41 The court's rationale was that a sentence at the high end
of the range would be a penalty in violation of the defendant's Fifth
36. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of determining the
sentencing range).
37. See infra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing the discretion held by judges to select
a sentence falling anywhere within the sentencing range).
38. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table). For example, the sentencing range
is zero to six months for a defendant with an offense level of one through eight and a criminal
history category of one. Id. The sentencing range is 324 to 405 months for a defendant with an
offense level of thirty-six and a criminal history category of six. Id.
39. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § I B1.4 ("In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline
range ... the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law."). However, judges are
expressly prohibited from considering the defendant's race, sex, national origin, creed, religion or
socio-economic status when selecting a sentence within the sentencing range. U.S.S.G., supra note
8, § 5HI.10.
40. JEFRI WOOD, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE OF
APPELLATE CASE LAW ON SELECTED ISSUES, 15 (2002) (discussing the views of various United
States Courts of Appeals on assorted sentencing issues), available at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/
jnetweb.nsf/autoframe?openform&url r-pages/556&urll=index (last visited Jan. 6, 2003) (on file
with author).
41. United States v. Rivera, 201 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 901
(2000). The defendant faced a sentencing range of 360 months to life. Id. at 102. The trial judge
imposed a sentence of 480 months, specifically attributing sixty months to the defendant's failure to
cooperate with authorities. Id. at 101. The sentence was overturned on appeal. Id. at 102.
466
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Amendment right to remain silent.4 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has
allowed sentencing judges to use a defendant's failure to cooperate with
authorities as a basis for selecting a sentence at the high end of the
sentencing range. 3 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the
defendant's argument that the sentence at the high end of the range was a
penalty for the exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.44 The
Second and Seventh Circuits appear to be the only circuits to have addressed
the issue. 5
The effect of the circuit split is that a defendant who refuses to
cooperate with authorities may receive a higher sentence in the Seventh
Circuit, or a circuit adopting the Seventh Circuit approach, than in the
Second Circuit, or a circuit adopting the Second Circuit approach. For
example, if the defendant in United States v. Rivera was sentenced in the
Seventh Circuit rather than the Second Circuit, he would have received a
sentence of 480 months rather than 360 months.46
It is not uncommon for defendants of white-collar crimes to refuse to
cooperate with authorities. 47 Thus, the circuit split has the potential to affect
a large number of defendants of white-collar crime. To the extent that
sentencing judges use a defendant's failure to cooperate with authorities as a
basis for selecting a sentence at the high end of the sentencing range, the
potential for sentencing disparity exists.
42. Id. at 101-02.
43. United States v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1991). The defendant faced a
sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. Id. at 709. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 180
months, attributed in part to the defendant's failure to cooperate with authorities. Id.
44. Id. at 710. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the midpoint of the
sentencing range should be used as a benchmark for sentencing purposes. Id. at 710-11.
45. See United States v. Gerby, No. 01-8077, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9768, at *15 (10th Cir.
May 22, 2002) (discussing the split of authority between the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit,
but not stating the position of any other circuits); United States v. Gonzales, No. 00-4137, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2701, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2002) (same). A detailed search of the Westlaw database
on January 31, 2002 revealed no other circuits addressing the issue.
46. Rivera, 201 F.3d at 101-02. The defendant faced a sentencing range of 360 months to life.
Id. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 480 months, specifically attributing sixty months to the
defendant's failure to cooperate with authorities. Id. However, the sentence was overturned by the
court of appeals. Id. at 102.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Rosch, No. 94-2888, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34030, at *1-2, 14-15
(7th Cir. Nov. 20, 1995) (failure to cooperate with authorities by a Chief Operating Officer charged
with embezzling bank funds and violating RICO laws); Max v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 48
T.C.M. (CCH) 984 (1984), 1984 WL 15313 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug. 30, 1984) (failure to cooperate with
authorities by a defendant charged with tax fraud).
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2. Section 1B1.11 - Ex Post Facto Concerns
Section 1Bl.1l(b)(3) of the Guidelines states: "[I]f the defendant is
convicted of two [related] offenses, the first committed before, and the
second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual becomes effective,
the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both
offenses."' 8 Constitutional concerns arise when laws that were not in effect
at the time the defendant committed a particular crime are used to calculate a
sentence for that crime. Specifically, the ex post facto clause of the United
States Constitution forbids retroactive application of laws if application
would result in a greater punishment than would have occurred under the
law in effect at the time the crime was committed. 49 A violation of the ex
post facto clause would appear to occur when retroactive application of a
new or amended Guideline provision occurs pursuant to Section
1 B 1.11 (b)(3), and the application results in a greater sentence than would
have resulted under the Guideline provision in effect on the date the crime
was committed. However, courts are split on the issue of whether an ex post
facto violation indeed occurs.5 °
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have held that Section 1BI.l1 (b)(3) of the Guidelines does not violate the ex
post facto clause. 5' The rationale has generally been that Section lB 1.11,
48. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § IBI.1 l(b)(3).
49. The ex post facto clause appears in Article I of the United States Constitution, which in broad
language simply prohibits any "ex post facto Law." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; see also id. § 10,
cl. I. In interpreting the ex post facto clause, the Supreme Court has stated: "[T]o fall within the ex
post facto prohibition, two critical elements must be present: first, the law 'must be retrospective,
that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment'; and second, 'it must disadvantage the
offender affected by it."' Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)).
50. WOOD, supra note 40, at 24-26.
51. United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1993) (no ex post facto violation where
the defendant was sentenced for multiple counts of embezzlement under revised Guideline sections,
even though some counts were committed before the revision). "The defendant [had] fair warning at
the time he [committed] his later acts that the prior ones may or will be used in determining his
sentence for the latter ones." Id. (internal citation omitted); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215,
218 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814 (2001) (no ex post facto violation because the
defendant "had ample warning, when she committed the later acts of tax evasion, that those acts
would cause her sentence for the earlier [related] crime to be determined in accordance with the
[amended] Guidelines"); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1999) (no ex post
facto violation because the defendant "had adequate notice at the time he committed the
counterfeiting offense in 1990 that his [1988] mail fraud offenses would be grouped with the
counterfeiting offense and therefore that the 1990 guidelines would apply"); United States v. Vivit,
214 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 (2000) ("the enactment of the grouping
rules provides fair notice such that the application of [Section] I B 1.11 (b)(3) ... does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause"); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1250-52 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated by
514 U.S. 1094 (1995), and reaff'd by 63 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1995) (no ex post facto violation because
at the time the defendant elected to commit the third of three related offenses, he was presumed to be
on notice of an amendment to the Guidelines that occurred after the first but before the third
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read in its entirety, gives defendants "notice" that when they continue to
commit related offenses, they risk sentencing for all of the offenses under
the Guidelines in effect on the date of the later committed offense.5 2 The
notice requirement that has been read into the ex post facto clause is deemed
to have been met.
53
In contrast, the Third and Ninth Circuits have held that Section
1B1.1 1(b)(3) violates the ex post facto clause. 4 These circuits ignore the
notice argument and broadly conclude that it is unconstitutional to impose
greater penalties than were required by the law in effect at the time an
offense); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001) (no ex post facto violation
because the defendant was presumed to have had notice that his pre-amendment tax offenses would
be grouped with his post-amendment tax offenses, and that all offenses would be sentenced under
the more severe post-amendment Guidelines); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1405-06 (11 th
Cir. 1997). In Bailey, the court found no ex post facto violation for a defendant sentenced under the
more severe 1991 Guidelines for a series of related offenses occurring from 1989 to 1992. The court
stated:
The one book rule ... provide[s] that related offenses committed in a series will be
sentenced together under the Sentencing Guidelines Manual in effect at the end of the
series. Thus, a defendant knows, when he continues to commit related crimes, that he
risks sentencing for all of his offenses under the latest, amended Sentencing Guidelines
Manual.
Id. at 1404-05.
52. See generally supra note 51.
53. Miller, 482 U.S. at 430 ("central to the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for 'the lack of
fair notice.., when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the
crime was consummated') (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981)) (emphasis added).
54. United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1403-04 (3d Cir. 1994). An ex post facto violation
occurred where an amendment to the Guidelines took place after completion of the first offense, but
before completion of a later related offense and the amendment resulted in a more severe penalty for
the first offense. Id. "Apparently, the district court believed that if the conduct is grouped together,
there is no need to assess the counts independently to determine whether ex post facto clause
considerations arise.... The fact that various counts of an indictment are grouped cannot override ex
post facto concerns .... " Id.; United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1997). In
Ortland, the court found an ex post facto violation where the defendant was sentenced for five
related mail fraud counts occurring over a span of several years. Id. at 541, 547. The same amended
Guideline section was applied to all counts even though the Guideline section was amended after
completion of the first offense but before completion of the last offense, and application of the
amended Guideline section resulted in a more severe sentence for the offense occurring before the
amendment. Id. at 546-47. The court stated:
[W]hen application of a version of the Guidelines enacted after the offense leads to a
higher punishment than would application of the Guidelines in effect at the time of the
offense, there is an ex post facto problem....
Application of [Section 1B.1l(b)(3)] in this case would violate the Constitution; its
application would cause [defendant's] sentence on earlier, completed counts to be
increased by a later Guideline.
Id.
offense was committed. 5 The rule adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits
is more favorable to defendants because it offers protection from harsher
Guidelines that might be enacted after committing the first of a series of
related offenses. 6
Fraud cases are particularly susceptible to application of Section
1 B 1.11 (b)(3). This is because fraud offenses often lapse over significant
spans of time and frequently involve multiple related counts.57 Because
amendments to the Guidelines occur every year,58 and many of the
amendments lead to increased sentences,5 9 there is an inherent risk that an
amendment that is unfavorable to a defendant will be enacted between the
first and last crime in a related string of offenses.
To illustrate, in United States v. Lewis,6° the defendant was charged with
four counts of tax evasion for a tax fraud scheme spanning a three-year
period.61 After the first offense, but before the last offense, the Guidelines
55. Beroli, 40 F.3d at 1403-04; Ortland, 109 F.3d at 546-47.
56. As an aside, it is interesting to note that Commentary to Section I B 1.11 of the Guidelines
states that both Congress and the Commission believe Section B 1.1 1 is altogether exempt from an
ex post facto analysis. Commentary to Section I B 1.11 states:
Although aware of possible ex post facto clause challenges to application of the
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, Congress did not believe that the ex post
facto clause would apply to amended sentencing guidelines. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 77-78 (1983). While the Commission concurs in the policy expressed by
Congress, courts to date generally have held that the ex post facto clause does apply to
sentencing guideline amendments that subject the defendant to increased punishment.
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § I BI.1, cmt. background. The Senate Report that is referred to in the
Commentary to Section I B 1.11 states:
The practice of the Parole Commission has been to use [its] guidelines currently in effect,
and this practice has generally withstood challenges that it violated the prohibition
against ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. The Committee
believes that the reasons given for upholding the Parole Commission practice are equally
applicable to the Sentencing Guidelines.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77-78 (1983), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3260-3261. Despite the belief
by Congress and the Commission that the ex post facto clause does not apply to the Guidelines, all
circuits (both the majority and minority circuits) to address the issue have held that the ex post facto
clause indeed does apply. See supra notes 51, 54. However, while the majority holds that the ex
post facto clause applies and an ex post facto analysis is therefore necessary, the majority believes
that the ex post facto clause is satisfied because defendants have "notice" of future sentencing
increases. See supra note 5 1. The end result under the majority rule is the same as if the ex post
facto clause simply did not apply altogether, as proposed by Congress and the Commission.
57. E.g., Regan, 989 F.2d at 45 (fifty-five related counts of embezzlement from 1987 to 1991);
Kimler, 167 F.3d at 890 (fourteen related counts of mail fraud and one count of counterfeiting from
1988 to 1990); Ortland, 109 F.3d at 541 (five related counts of mail fraud in an investment scheme
from 1986 to 1990); United States v. Scott, No. 95-2078, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5397, at *1-2 (7th
Cir. Mar. 19, 1997) (forty-four related counts of mail fraud and one count of making a false
statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1983 to 1985).
58. See infra note 204 (citing all amendments from 1987 through 2001).
59. See supra notes 51, 54 (providing examples of cases in which post-amendment Guidelines
were more detrimental to defendants than pre-amendment Guidelines).
60. 235 F.3dat215.
61. Id. at 216-17.
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were amended to increase the base offense level for tax evasion from eleven
to thirteen.62 As a result, the minimum sentence that the defendant faced
increased from eight months to twelve months.63 The Fourth Circuit, in
accordance with the previously discussed rule, found no ex post facto
violation.64 The court allowed the amended Guideline section to be applied
to all charges, including those occurring before the date of the amendment.
65
Had the defendant been convicted in the Third or Ninth Circuit, an ex post
facto violation would have occurred.66 The Guideline in effect on the date of
the earlier offense would have been applied to the earlier offense, and the
defendant would have received a lesser aggregate sentence. Sentencing
disparity clearly resulted to the detriment of the defendant.
To summarize, defendants of white-collar crimes convicted of multiple,
related counts spanning more than one amendment period may face different
sentences depending on the circuit of conviction. The majority rule allows a
new or amended Guideline to be applied to all related counts, including
those occurring before enactment or amendment of the Guideline. The
majority rule is detrimental to defendants if the new or amended Guideline
results in a sentence for the earlier offense that is harsher than what the
sentence would have been under the Guideline in effect on the date of the
earlier offense. In contrast, the minority rule prohibits a new or amended
Guideline from being applied to related counts occurring before enactment
or amendment of the Guideline. The minority rule is beneficial to
defendants if the new or amended Guideline results in a sentence for the
earlier offense that is harsher than what the sentence would have been under
the Guideline in effect on the date of the earlier offense. Because the
minority rule is more favorable to defendants than the majority rule, a source
of sentencing disparity exists.
3. Section 2B 1.1 - Loss Calculation
In past years, a great deal of controversy had been generated regarding
interpretation and application of the "loss" concept for the sentencing of
white-collar crimes.67 In fact, the loss calculation had been one of the most
62. Id. at 217.
63. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (1993) (Sentencing Table).
64. Lewis, 235 F.3dat 218.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 54 (discussing the positions of the Third and Ninth Circuits).
67. Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal
Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 464 (1998). A loss calculation is
frequently litigated issues in sentencing law.6' Fortunately, a major
amendment to the Guidelines occurred in 2001, at which time the
Commission resolved most of the disputes in the loss area.69 Prior to the
2001 amendment there were numerous splits of authority among the circuit
courts regarding the loss calculation.70 Because the splits of authority were
resolved by the 2001 amendment, they no longer constitute a source of
white-collar sentencing disparity. Accordingly, they will not be further
discussed here. However, it is noteworthy that the Commission, through its
amendment enacting authority, resolved circuit splits and eliminated a
significant source of sentencing disparity.
4. Section 3A1.1 - Vulnerable Victim Adjustment for Indirect Victim
Section 3AI.1 (b)(1) of the Guidelines permits an upward adjustment to
an offense level if the victim of the offense was a "vulnerable victim."'7' A
circuit split exists regarding whether the adjustment may be applied when
the vulnerable victim was an "indirect" victim of the offense.72 The Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a Section 3Al.l(b)(1) upward
adjustment may be applied where the vulnerable victim was an indirect
victim of the offense.73 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit has held that a Section
3Al.l(b)(1) upward adjustment cannot be applied for a vulnerable indirect
required to determine the offense level for defendants sentenced under the fraud Guideline.
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2B1.1(b)(l).
68. Bowman, supra note 67, at 464 n.2 (noting that a search of the Westlaw database for all
federal appellate opinions, excluding the United States Supreme Court, revealed that the concept of
"loss" for sentencing purposes was discussed in 894 cases decided from November 1987 to August
1997).
69. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C, amend. 617. Among the significant changes from the
amendment was a consolidation of the Guideline section for fraud (§ 2F1.1) with the Guideline
section for theft (§ 231.1). The two Guideline sections are now combined at Section 2B1.1.
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2B1.1.
70. Bowman, supra note 67, at 464 n.3 (presenting a list of the then existing splits of authority).
71. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3A.l(b)(l) ("If the defendant knew or should have known that a
victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels.").
72. Marshall J. Lerman et al., Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Sentencing
Guidelines, 89 GEO. L.J. 1655, 1663 n.1992 (2001).
73. United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 655 (5th Cir. 1997) (adjustment applied where patients
were made addicted to pain treatment as part of an insurance fraud scheme; the patients were merely
indirect victims of the scheme and the insurer was the direct victim); United States v. Sherwood, 98
F.3d 402, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1996) (adjustment applied where a teenager was kidnapped and forced to
strip and pose for photographs; the charge was money laundering conspiracy rather than kidnapping,
and the teenager was merely an indirect victim of the crime of money laundering); United States v.
Yount, 960 F.2d 955, 957-58 (11 th Cir. 1992) (adjustment applied where the bank accounts of
elderly individuals were raided by a bank vice-president; the elderly individuals were merely indirect
victims, and the bank was the direct victim because it reimbursed the individuals' accounts when the
scheme was discovered).
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victim.74  The effect of the split is that a defendant causing harm to a
vulnerable indirect victim may receive a higher sentence if sentenced in the
Fifth, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits, or a circuit following the rationale of
those circuits, than if sentenced in the Sixth Circuit, or a circuit following
the rationale of the Sixth Circuit.
To illustrate, in United States v. Sidhu,75 the defendant was a physician
convicted of an insurance fraud scheme involving fraudulent billings to
Medicare and Medicaid.76 Medicare and Medicaid were the direct victims of
the offense.77 During the course of the scheme, several patients who were
deemed vulnerable indirect victims became addicted to pain medicine. 8
The patients were indirect victims because the scheme, although aimed at
Medicare and Medicaid, used the patients as unsuspecting instrumentalities
of the offense. 79 The court held that the harm to the patients, even though
they were only indirect victims, could support a Section 3A 1. l(b)(1) upward
adjustment." Had the defendant been convicted in the Sixth Circuit, or a
circuit following the Sixth Circuit rationale, the adjustment would not have
been applied and the sentence would not have been as high. As a
consequence of the circuit split, sentencing disparity occurred to the
detriment of the defendant.
A two-level upward adjustment, such as the vulnerable victim
adjustment, can increase a sentence by as many as sixty-eight months. 8' It is
not unusual for "vulnerable victims" to be harmed in white-collar crime
cases. 82 Therefore, the potential for white-collar sentencing disparity in the
74. United States v. Dixon, 66 F.3d 133, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1995). The adjustment was not applied
where the vulnerable victim, a payee whose name was falsely endorsed on a pension check, was
merely an indirect victim of the offense of conviction. Id. The payee was an indirect victim in the
sense that he suffered a temporary loss of funds to which he was entitled. Id. at 135. However, the
credit union's insurance company was the direct victim because the insurance company ultimately
bore the loss. Id. at 136. The court stated that "[t]hough other circuits have held that a nexus
between the alleged harm suffered [by the vulnerable victim] and the defendant's offense of
conviction is not required, the Sixth Circuit ... requires [such a nexus]." Id. at 135 (citing Yount,
960 F.2d at 958; United States v. Wright, 12 F.3d 70, 73 (6th Cir. 1993)).
75. 130 F.3d at 644.
76. Id. at 647.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 655.
80. Id.
81. For example, for a defendant with an offense level of forty and a criminal history category of
one, a two-level upward adjustment into an offense level of forty-two would increase the low end of
the sentencing range from 292 months to 360 months. This is an increase of sixty-eight months or
twenty-three percent. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
82. E.g., United States v. Medrano, 241 F.3d 740, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
473
context of Section 3Al.l(b)(1) adjustments is evident. To the extent that
vulnerable victims are also deemed to be indirect victims of the offense,
sentencing disparity may result. Where vulnerable indirect victims are
involved, defendants sentenced in the Fifth, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits, or
circuits following the rationale of these circuits, may face significantly
longer sentences than defendants sentenced in the Sixth Circuit, or circuits
following the rationale of the Sixth Circuit.
5. Section 3B 1.2 - Mitigating Role Adjustment for Conduct Outside the
Offense of Conviction
Section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines permits a reduction in the offense level
if the defendant was a "minimal" or "minor" participant in the crime.83 A
circuit split exists regarding the scope of conduct that courts may look to in
determining the defendant's role in the crime. The issue arises most
frequently when the defendant is charged with one crime that is part of a
larger uncharged criminal enterprise.85 In such cases, the defendant is
usually only minimally involved in the overall criminal enterprise but highly
86ardiie astinvolved in the specific offense of conviction. Courts are divided as to
whether the defendant's activity in the larger criminal enterprise outside the
offense of conviction may justify a downward adjustment for the offense of
conviction.
963 (2001) (involving a vulnerable victim who was harmed when a bank employee embezzled funds
from a bank); United States v. Luca, 183 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving a vulnerable
victim who was harmed when a defendant committed securities fraud in connection with a Ponzi
scheme); United States v. Hogan, 121 F.3d 370, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1997) (involving a vulnerable
victim who was harmed when a securities broker sold counterfeit certificates of deposit to his
clients); United States v. Hardesty, 105 F.3d 558, 558-59 (10th Cir. 1997) (involving a vulnerable
victim who was harmed when a defendant engaged in embezzlement, money laundering, and mail
fraud in a scheme to defraud a trust fund).
83. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.2. The Guideline states:
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by
4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by
2 levels.
In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.
Id. The reduction in offense level is intended to prevent minimal or minor participants from being
punished as severely as major participants because minimal or minor participants are generally
thought to be less culpable than major participants. Id. cmt. n.4.
84. Timothy P. Tobin, Comment, Drug Couriers: A Call for Action by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1075 (1999) (discussing the split of authority in the
context of sentencing drug couriers).
85. Id. at 1076-80 (discussing the analysis of the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits).
86. Id.
474
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Most circuits addressing the issue have held that the court must look
only to the conduct comprising the offense of conviction. 87 In contrast, the
Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the court may look to all of the
defendant's conduct, including participation in the larger uncharged criminal
enterprise.
88
Most cases in which the issue has arisen involve drugs, but the issue has
also arisen in cases involving white-collar crime.89 For example, in United
States v. Anderson,9" the defendant was convicted of bank fraud. The
defendant sought a downward adjustment for his minor role in a larger
uncharged bank fraud.9 ' The court denied the adjustment, concluding that
conduct outside the offense of conviction may not be considered for
purposes of a Section 3B1.2 downward adjustment.92 Had the case been
tried in the Third or Ninth Circuit, the adjustment could have been granted
and the defendant could have received a lesser sentence. Thus, sentencing
disparity in a white-collar context occurred to the detriment of the defendant.
The circuit split presents a potentially significant source of sentencing
disparity for defendants of white-collar crimes.
87. United States v. Gomez, 31 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1994) (the court must look only to the
offense of conviction, despite the defendant's claim that he had a lesser role in the overall uncharged
drug conspiracy); United States v. Atanda, 60 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1995) (the court must look
only to the offense of conviction, despite the defendant's claim that he had a lesser role in the overall
uncharged tax fraud conspiracy); United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2000) (the
court must look only to the offense of conviction, despite the defendant's claim that he had a lesser
role in the overall uncharged drug conspiracy); United States v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 555 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v.
James, 157 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 943-
44 (11 th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same;
the court stated that a contrary result "would provide criminals with the incentive to be involved (or
at least claim to be involved) tangentially in larger schemes in addition to the smaller conspiracies
for which they are charged").
88. United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 239-41 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the court
must look beyond the offense of conviction; a defendant's relative culpability should be assessed by
considering all relevant conduct and "not simply on the basis of the ... acts referenced in the count
of conviction"); United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "a
mitigating role adjustment under § 3B1.2 is not limited to the defendant's role in the offense of
conviction").
89. E.g., Atanda, 60 F.3d at 198 (tax fraud conspiracy); United States v. Anderson, No. 97-3019,
WL 411649, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 1997) (bank fraud); see also Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 239
("[lt should be noted that the relevance of these factors is not necessarily limited to [drug] couriers.
Rather, these considerations are directed generally towards a defendant's involvement, knowledge,
and culpability, and should provide guidance in any case.").
90. 1997WL411649,at*1-2.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Olibrices, 979 F.2d at 1559-60).
6. Section 3B1.3 - Abuse of a Position of Trust
Section 3B1.3 of the Guidelines states: "If the defendant abused a
position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase [the
offense level] by 2 levels. 9 3  Circuit splits have arisen in two distinct
contexts with respect to Section 3B1.3. The first involves the definition of a
position of trust. The second involves different views regarding whether a
defendant's abuse of a position of trust outside the offense of conviction
may trigger the upward adjustment. Each of these contexts is discussed
below.
i. Defining a Position of Trust
In attempting to define a position of trust, commentary to Section 3B 1.3
states: "'Public or private trust' refers to a position ... characterized by
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary
judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). 94 Despite this
guidance, there is inconsistency among the circuit courts in defining a
position of trust.95 The Sixth and D.C. Circuits adhere closely to the
"managerial discretion" language stated in the commentary.96 In contrast,
the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits adopt a broadened view and look to
whether the defendant, regardless of managerial discretion, has the freedom
to commit a "difficult-to-detect wrong. 97
93. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.3.
94. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.3, cmt. n.l (emphasis added). The commentary includes an
illustration:
This adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an embezzlement of a client's funds
by an attorney serving as a guardian, [or] a bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme ....
This adjustment does not apply in the case of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary
bank teller or hotel clerk because such positions are not characterized by the above-
described factors.
Id.
95. WOOD, supra note 40, at 158-60.
96. United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 502-03 (6th Cir. 1995) (no position of trust for a
customer service representative at a bank who embezzled money given to her by a customer; the
court held that "[t]he element of professional or managerial discretion is said to be the key," and the
defendant did not have the required level of managerial discretion); United States v. West, 56 F.3d
216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (no position of trust for a courier who stole checks from delivery
packages; the court stated that "the commentary's focus on positions characterized by professional
or managerial discretion places a significant limit on the types of positions subject to the abuse-of-
trust enhancement," and the defendant's duties involved "almost no discretion whatsoever").
97. United States v. Allen, 201 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2000). In finding an abuse of a position of
trust for a defendant whose duties were merely ministerial in nature, the court stated:
[Defendant] contends that the District Court misapplied [§ 3B1.3] ... because her
employment responsibilities were at most "secretarial" or "ministerial," and therefore
devoid of the "professional or managerial discretion" necessary to constitute a position of
476
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The managerial discretion standard is narrower and does not encompass
many lower-level employees who might trigger an upward adjustment under
the difficult-to-detect wrong test. The effect of the circuit split is that a
defendant with the ability to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong, but with no
managerial discretion, might receive an upward adjustment, and therefore a
higher sentence, if convicted in the Second, Third, or Ninth Circuit, or
circuits adopting this rationale, than if convicted in the Sixth or D.C.
Circuits, or circuits adopting the rationale of those circuits.
To illustrate, in United States v. Oplinger,9" the defendant was a bank
supply coordinator accused of defrauding the bank in a scheme involving
returns of office supplies for cash.99 The court imposed a two-level upward
adjustment under Section 3B 1.3 for abuse of a position of trust because the
defendant's position provided him with the "freedom to commit a difficult-
to-detect wrong."' 00  The adjustment was imposed even though the
defendant was employed in a low-level position and had no managerial
discretion.' 0 ' Had the defendant been convicted in the Sixth or D.C.
Circuits, or a circuit adhering to the narrow "managerial discretion" test
adopted by those circuits, the upward adjustment would not have been
imposed. As a consequence of the circuit split, sentencing disparity
occurred to the detriment of the defendant.
A two-level upward adjustment, such as the abuse of a position of trust
adjustment, can increase a sentence by as many as sixty-eight months. 10 2
trust. We disagree. An employee need not have a fancy title or be a "big shot" in an
organization to qualify for an enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. Rather,
applicability of a § 3B1.3 enhancement turns on "the extent to which the position
provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong."
Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 993 (3d Cir. 1992) (abuse
of a position of trust for a defendant who was the sole employee responsible for balancing a
company's suspense account; the defendant "was placed in a position to commit a 'difficult-to-detect
wrong,' ... [t]hus, he occupied a position of trust") (citation omitted); United States v. Oplinger, 150
F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (abuse of a position of trust for a supply coordinator who returned
supplies for cash and kept the proceeds; the court, rejecting the defendant's contention that a low-
level, non-managerial position such as a supply coordinator was not a position of trust, stated that
"the primary trait that distinguishes a person in a position of trust from one who is not is the extent to
which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong") (citation omitted);
accord United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1993) (abuse of a position of trust for a
postal carier; the court stated that "[i]t would be contrary to logic and common sense to hold that
just because a person has a 'low-level' job, he cannot be considered to occupy a position of trust").
98. 150F.3dat 1061.
99. Id. at 1063-64.
100. Id. at 1069.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 81 (acknowledging that a two-level upward adjustment can increase the low
Section 3B1.3 adjustments are sought in a relatively high number of white-
collar crime cases. 0 3  Thus, to the extent that defendants of white-collar
crimes are in a position to commit a "difficult-to-detect wrong," but lack
managerial discretion, the split of authority presents a source of sentencing
disparity.
ii. Abuse of a Position of Trust as Conduct Outside the Offense of
Conviction
A circuit split also exists regarding whether an abuse of a position of
trust that occurs outside the offense of conviction may warrant an upward
adjustment under Section 3B1.3.10 4 For example, a defendant might abuse a
position of trust in unlawfully obtaining funds from his employer.' °5 The
defendant might subsequently be convicted of tax evasion, but not
embezzlement or a similar charge relating to the actual theft of the funds
from the employer. Under these circumstances, the abuse of a position of
trust is independent of the offense of conviction. 0
6
There are two views as to whether an abuse of a position of trust that
leads to, but is independent of, the offense of conviction may warrant an
upward adjustment under Section 3B1.3. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
adopt a narrow view and hold that the adjustment may not be imposed
because the abuse of a position of trust is one step removed from the offense
of conviction.'07 Conversely, the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopt a
broad view and are willing to look beyond the offense of conviction to find
an abuse of a position of trust.'0 8 The effect of the circuit split is that a
end of the sentencing range by sixty-eight months).
103. E.g., United States v. Hussey, 254 F.3d 428, 429-30 (2d Cir. 2001) (adjustment sought for a
defendant convicted of securities fraud); United States v. Sonsalla, 241 F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir.
2001) (adjustment sought for a defendant convicted of making false entries in bank records); United
States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (adjustment sought for a defendant convicted
of receiving kickbacks in return for Medicare referrals).
104. WOOD, supra note 40, at 162-63.
105. United States v. Guidry, 199 F.3d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (the defendant abused a
position of trust as an accountant and embezzled funds from her employer).
106. Id. (the defendant was convicted of tax evasion but not embezzlement).
107. Id. at 1159-60 (although the defendant abused a position of trust as an accountant when
embezzling funds from her employer, she was only convicted of tax evasion and had no position of
trust with respect to the victim of the offense, the federal government); United States v. Barakat, 130
F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (11 th Cir. 1997) (a defendant convicted only of tax evasion could not receive an
adjustment for abusing a position of trust as head of a county housing authority in obtaining the
underlying funds).
108. United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1998) (an adjustment was imposed for
an executive who embezzled money from his employer even though the sole offense of conviction
was tax evasion); United States v. Bhagavan, 116 F.3d 189, 193 (7th Cir. 1997) (an adjustment was
imposed for a company president who diverted corporate funds to himself even though the sole
offense of conviction was tax evasion; the adjustment was deemed appropriate because the breach of
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defendant who abuses a position of trust leading up to an independent
uncharged crime may receive a greater sentence if sentenced in the Third,
Seventh, or Ninth Circuits, or a circuit adopting this rationale, than if
sentenced in the Tenth or Eleventh Circuits, or a ,circuit adopting the
rationale of those circuits.
To illustrate, in United States v. Barakat, 10 9 the Eleventh Circuit refused
to impose an upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust where the
defendant abused his position of trust by receiving kickbacks from an entity
that conducted business with his employer." 0 The defendant was convicted
of tax evasion, but not mail fraud or any similar charges related to the receipt
of funds that he failed to report as taxable income."' A Section 3B1.3
upward adjustment that was imposed by the district court was reversed on
appeal, and the sentencing range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months was
decreased to a range of fifteen to twenty-one months." 2  Had the court of
appeals followed the rationale of the Third, Seventh, or Ninth Circuits, the
higher sentencing range would have remained in effect. As a consequence
of the circuit split, sentencing disparity occurred as illustrated by the
reduction in the sentencing range.
In cases involving white-collar crime, it is not uncommon for an abuse
of a position of trust to occur leading up to the offense of conviction. 13 This
is particularly true of crimes involving tax evasion. 14  A two-level
adjustment, such as the abuse of a position of trust adjustment, can increase
trust was part of the "overall scheme" of tax evasion); United States v. Duran, 15 F.3d 131, 132-34
(9th Cir. 1994) (an adjustment was imposed for a police officer who stole money from arrested
individuals even though the sole offense of conviction was "structuring financial transactions to
avoid reporting requirements; the court stated that, "in considering an abuse of trust adjustment, a
sentencing court may consider conduct other than that involved in the offense of conviction").
109. 130 F.3d 1448, 1448 (11 th Cir. 1997).
110. Id. at 1449-50, 1454-55.
lll. Id. at 1449.
112. Id. at 1449-50. The adjusted offense level was sixteen before the reversal of the two-level
adjustment for abuse of a position of trust. Id. at 1449. The sentencing range for an offense level of
sixteen was twenty-one to twenty-seven months. Id.; U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (1997)
(Sentencing Table). After the reversal of the adjustment, the offense level decreased to fourteen.
See Bakarat, 130 F.3d at 1456 (noting reversal of the adjustment). The sentencing range for an
offense level of fourteen was fifteen to twenty-one months. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A
(1997) (Sentencing Table).
113. See supra notes 107-08 (discussing cases involving an abuse of a position of trust outside the
offense of conviction).
114. See supra notes 107-08 (discussing cases involving an abuse of position of trust leading to
charges of, among other things, tax evasion).
a sentence by as many as sixty-eight months." 5 Thus, the split of authority
presents a potentially significant source of white-collar sentencing disparity.
7. Section 3E1.1 - Loss of the Acceptance of Responsibility Adjustment
Section 3El.l(a) of the Guidelines states: "If the defendant clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the
offense level by 2 levels."' 1 6 If the downward adjustment is earned, it may
subsequently be lost for behavior that is inconsistent with the defendant's
acceptance of responsibility. For example, defendants often lose the
downward adjustment for engaging in the same course of unlawful activity
after arrest but before sentencing. 1 7 However, there is a split of authority as
to whether the adjustment may be lost for unlawful activity that is unrelated
to the offense of conviction."
18
Most circuits hold that unlawful conduct engaged in after arrest but
before sentencing, which is unrelated to the offense of conviction, may
indeed serve as a basis for denying a Section 3E1.1 downward adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility. " 9 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held
115. See supra note 81 (acknowledging that a two-level upward adjustment can increase the low
end of the sentencing range by sixty-eight months).
116. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3El.1(a). There are several factors that a court may consider in
determining whether a defendant qualifies for the adjustment. Appropriate considerations include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction...
(b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations;
(c) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt;
(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the offense;
(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of
the offense;
(f) voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of the
offense;
(g) post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment); and
(h) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of
responsibility.
Id. at cmt. n. 1.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 691 (11th Cir. 1995) (defendant's
continued use of drugs while on pretrial release for pending drug charges caused the loss of a
Section 3El downward adjustment); United States v. Reed, 951 F.2d 97, 99-100 (6th Cir. 1991)
(defendant's continued engagement in credit card fraud while in jail awaiting sentencing for credit
card fraud caused the loss of a Section 3E 1.1 downward adjustment).
118. WOOD, supra note 40, at 209-10.
119. United States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600-01 (Ist Cir. 1991) (involving the loss of a Section
3E1.1 adjustment due to drug use while awaiting trial for a postal offense); Unites States v. Darling,
No. 00-1353, 2001 WL 30664, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 2001) (involving the loss of a Section 3E.lI
adjustment due to the possession of a false identification card while awaiting sentencing for theft of
information from the Social Security Administration); United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 131
(3d Cir. 1996) (involving the loss of a Section 3ElI adjustment due to drug use while awaiting
sentencing for theft); United States v. Daniels, No. 98-4279, 1999 WL 152633, at *1-2 (4th Cir.
Mar. 22, 1999) (involving the loss of a Section 3E1.1 adjustment due to drug use while awaiting
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that unrelated conduct cannot serve as a basis for denying a Section 3El.1
downward adjustment. 20  The effect of the split of authority is that a
defendant who engages in unlawful conduct while awaiting sentencing for
an unrelated offense may receive a lower sentence if convicted in the Sixth
Circuit than if convicted in most other circuits.
To illustrate, in United States v. Pace,'21 the defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to commit tax fraud.'22 The defendant admitted to the charges
and qualified for a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
under Section 3El1.1. 23 However, after arrest but before sentencing, the
defendant tested positive for drug use in violation of one of his conditions of
release. 24  The Eleventh Circuit denied the downward adjustment, even
though the defendant's drug use was unrelated to the offense of conspiracy
to commit tax fraud. 25  Had the adjustment been applied, as would have
occurred in the Sixth Circuit, the offense level would have been decreased
by two levels. This would have reduced the defendant's eleven-month
sentence by several months.1 26 As a consequence of the split of authority,
sentencing disparity occurred to the detriment of the defendant.
A two-level adjustment, such as the acceptance of responsibility
adjustment, can have a significant impact on sentencing. 27  It is not
uncommon for defendants of white-collar crimes to commit unrelated
sentencing for gun possession); United States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir. 1990)
(involving the loss of a Section 3El.I adjustment due to drug use while awaiting sentencing for
treasury check fraud); United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving the
loss of a Section 3EI.1 adjustment due to drug use while awaiting sentencing for a counterfeiting
charge); United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1996) (involving the loss of a Section
3El. I adjustment due to drug use while awaiting sentencing for assault); United States v. Prince, 204
F.3d 1021, 1022-24 (10th Cir. 2000) (involving the loss of a Section 3El.1 adjustment due to
stabbing an individual while awaiting sentencing for bank robbery), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1121
(2000); United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 n.7 (1 th Cir. 1994) (involving the loss of a Section
3E1.1 adjustment due to drug use while awaiting sentencing for conspiracy to commit tax fraud).
120. United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 733-35 (6th Cir. 1993) (the defendant's drug use
and attempted theft while on bail pending sentencing for possession of a firearm could not serve as a
basis for denying a Section 3El.1 adjustment; the court held that "criminal activity committed after
indictment/information but before sentencing, which is wholly distinct from the crime(s) for which a
defendant is being sentenced," may not be used as the basis for denial of a Section 3El.I
adjustment).
121. 17 F.3d at 341.
122. Id. at 342.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 343 n.7.
126. Id. at 342.
127. See supra note 81 (acknowledging that a two-level adjustment can impact the low end of the
sentencing range by sixty-eight months).
unlawful activity while awaiting sentencing.'28 Thus, the split of authority
presents a potentially significant source of white-collar sentencing disparity.
8. Section 4A1.3 - Criminal History: Departure Based on Prior
"Dissimilar" Conduct
For purposes of calculating a sentence under the Guidelines, a defendant
is assigned a criminal history category ranging from one to six.'29 The
criminal history category is determined by assigning points based on the
number and length of prior sentences imposed upon the defendant. 130 Many
unlawful acts either do not result in the imposition of a sentence, or result in
a sentence that under-represents the nature of the defendant's actual
conduct. 13' Therefore, a risk exists that the criminal history category might
under-represent the extent or seriousness of a defendant's criminal past.
The Commission recognizes this risk and allows a sentencing court to
depart upward from a sentencing range "[i]f reliable information indicates
that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness
of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant
will commit other crimes .... In assessing a defendant's criminal
128. E.g.. United States v. Darling, No. 00-1353, 2001 WL 30664, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 2001)
(the defendant was found in possession of a false identification card while awaiting sentencing for
theft of information from the Social Security Administration); United States v. Barker, No. 95-5949,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 13165, at *1-2 (6th Cir. June 3, 1996) (the defendant was engaged in drug
use while awaiting sentencing for mail fraud in connection with an insurance fraud scheme); Pace,
17 F.3d at 343-44, n.7 (the defendant was engaged in drug use while awaiting sentencing for
conspiracy to commit tax fraud); United States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir.1990) (the
defendant was engaged in drug use while awaiting sentencing for treasury check fraud).
129. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 4A1.l. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how a defendant's criminal history category impacts the calculation of a sentence.
130. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 4A1.L (illustrating how to calculate the criminal history category).
131. Id.; Michael Edmund O'Neill, Abraham's Legacy: An Empirical Assessment of (Nearly)
First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 305 (2001) (acknowledging that
criminal history points do not necessarily reflect the extent of a defendant's true criminal past).
132. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 4A1.3. The Guideline more fully states:
If reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence
departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range. Such information may include,
but is not limited to, information concerning:
(a) prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history category (g,
sentences for foreign and tribal offenses);
(b) prior sentence(s) of substantially more than one year imposed as a result of
independent crimes committed on different occasions;
(c) prior similar misconduct established by a civil adjudication or by a failure to
comply with an administrative order;
(d) whether the defendant was pending trial or sentencing on another charge at the
time of the instant offense;
(e) prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction.
Id. (emphasis added).
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history, a court may consider, among other things, information concerning
"prior similar ... criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction. '133
Although Section 4A1.3 does not expressly permit a court to consider prior
dissimilar conduct in assessing criminal history, two circuits have ruled that
judges may indeed consider prior dissimilar conduct. A circuit split has
evolved with respect to this issue. 3
The First Circuit has held that "a criminal history departure can be based
upon prior dissimilar conduct that was neither charged nor the subject of a
[prior] conviction." 135  The rationale of the court was that the list of
departure grounds stated in Section 4A1.3, which includes the word
"similar" in describing prior conduct to be considered, is not an exclusive
list of departure grounds. 136 The court allowed an upward departure under
Section 4A1.3 based on the defendant's seventeen-year history of uncharged
domestic violence that was dissimilar to the firearms offense with which he
was presently charged. 137  Similar to the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit
has also held that a criminal history departure can be based upon prior
dissimilar conduct. 138
In contrast, the Second Circuit has stated that, in considering whether to
invoke a Section 4A1.3 upward departure, a court may not consider prior
uncharged conduct that was dissimilar to the instant offense. 139 To illustrate,
in sentencing the defendant for possession of false immigration documents,
and in considering whether to depart upward from the sentencing range
under Section 4A1.3, the Second Circuit refused to consider the defendant's
prior uncharged acts of homicide, terrorism, and drug trafficking. 40
The holding of the Second Circuit is more beneficial to defendants.
This is because sentencing judges are not permitted to consider prior
133. Id. § 4A1.3(e) (2001) (emphasis added).
134. WOOD, supra note 40, at 335.
135. United States v. Brewster, 127 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 26-27. The court reasoned that Section 4A1.3 "states explicitly that the list of five
illustrations is not intended to be exhaustive .... [To] preclude[] any consideration of dissimilar
misconduct ... would frustrate the 'included, but not limited to' caveat that the Sentencing
Commission deliberately inserted in the text of section 4A1.3." Id. at 26.
137. Id. at 26.
138. United States v. Schweihs, 971 F.2d 1302, 1319 (7th Cir. 1992). The court stated that
"similarity between the prior conduct and the offense of conviction is not necessary." Id. The court
reasoned that although Section 4A1.3(e) includes the word "similar" in describing prior conduct to
be considered, Section 4A1.3 expressly states that the list of examples, including the example at
Section 4Al.3(e), is not exhaustive. Id.
139. United States v. Chunza-Plazas, 45 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a sentencing judge
may consider prior unlawful conduct "only if it is 'similar' to the crime of conviction").
140. Id. at 57.
483
dissimilar conduct as grounds for a Section 4AI.3 upward departure. The
effect of the circuit split is that a defendant who engaged in prior uncharged
conduct that was dissimilar to the present offense of conviction could
receive a higher sentence in the First or Seventh Circuit, or a circuit adopting
the rule of those circuits, than in the Second Circuit, or a circuit adopting the
rule of the Second Circuit.
An illustration of the resulting sentencing disparity in a white-collar
crime context may be found in United States v. Walker.14' In Walker, the
defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit credit card fraud.,42 The
court imposed an upward departure from the calculated sentencing range
based in part on the defendant's prior dissimilar conduct involving
"shoplifting and.., pimping.' 43 The case took place in the Seventh Circuit,
where an upward departure on such unrelated grounds was permitted.
144
Had the defendant been convicted in the Second Circuit, or a circuit
adopting the rule of the Second Circuit, the upward departure would have
been denied and the defendant would have received a lesser sentence. As a
consequence of the circuit split, sentencing disparity occurred to the
detriment of the defendant.
9. Section 5G1.3 - Sentence "Consecutive" to a Term Imposed for
Violation of Probation or Supervised Release
Application Note six to Section 5G1.3 of the Guidelines states, in
relevant part:
Revocations. If the defendant was on federal or state probation,
parole, or supervised release at the time of the instant offense, and
has had such probation, parole, or supervised release revoked
[because of the commission of the instant offense], the sentence for
the instant offense should be imposed to run consecutively to the
term imposed for the violation of probation, parole, or supervised
release. 145
A circuit split has evolved regarding whether the word "should" in
Section 5G1.3 requires, or merely suggests, that the sentence for the instant
offense run consecutively to the term imposed for violation of probation,
parole, or supervised release. 46 The First, Fifth, Eight, and Ninth Circuits
141. 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996).
142. Id. at 945.
143. Id. at 948.
144. Id. at 947-48.
145. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5G1.3, cmt. n.6 (emphasis added).
146. WOOD, supra note 40, at 282-83.
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have held that Section 5G 1.3 requires a consecutive sentence. 47 In contrast,
the Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that Section 5G1.3
only suggests a consecutive sentence. 48 The difference is important because
if Section 5G1.3 only suggests a consecutive sentence, the court therefore
has discretion to impose a concurrent sentence. 49 A concurrent sentence is a
significant benefit to the defendant because multiple sentences are served at
the same time rather than one after another. 50 However, it should be noted
that the circuit split only has an impact on sentencing if the judge exercises
his or her discretion and elects a concurrent rather than consecutive
sentencing scheme.
The case of United States v. Chapman'5' illustrates this issue in a white-
collar context. In Chapman, the defendant was convicted of bank fraud
resulting from a check-kiting scheme.' 52 At the time of the offense, the
defendant was under supervised release from a prior unrelated offense.'53
The court imposed a sentence of thirty-two months for the bank fraud charge
147. United States v. Gondek, 65 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "application note 4 [now
note 6] is mandatory"); United States v. Alexander, 100 F.3d 24, 27 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"Application Note 6 is mandatory notwithstanding its use of the term 'should'); United States v.
Goldman, 228 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that "notwithstanding the Sentencing
Commission's use of the word 'should' rather than 'shall,' Application Note 6 is mandatory and
requires consecutive sentences"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1175 (2001); United States v. Bernard, 48
F.3d 427, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Application Note 4 (now Note 6) "required" a
consecutive sentence).
148. United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999) ("'[Sjhould' implies, suggests, and
recommends, but does not require. The use of 'should' in Application Note 6 provides a sentencing
court with the discretion to take a course of action not suggested by the Note .... "); United States v.
Swan, 275 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2002) ("we agree with the courts holding that the language of...
application note [6] is permissive [rather than mandatory]"); United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944,
945 (7th Cir. 1996) (Application Note 6 creates only a "presumption in favor of consecutive
sentencing"); United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 979 (10th Cir. 2001) ("we conclude that
sentencing courts possess the discretion to determine, under U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3(c) and application
note 6, whether to impose a sentence concurrent with, partially concurrent with, or consecutive to a
prior undischarged term of imprisonment"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1153 (2002).
149. Maria, 186 F.3d at 69.
150. Concurrent and consecutive sentences are defined as follows:
concurrent sentences. Two or more sentences of jail time to be served simultaneously.
For example, if a defendant receives concurrent sentences of 5 years and 15 years, the
total amount of jail time is 15 years.
consecutive sentences. Two or more sentences of jail time to be served in sequence. For
example, if a defendant receives consecutive sentences of 20 years and 5 years, the total
amount of jail time is 25 years.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1367 (7th ed. 1999).
151. 241 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 60.
153. Id. at 59.
and required that the sentence run consecutive to the twenty-four month
sentence imposed for revocation of supervised release. 154 Had the defendant
been convicted in the Second, Third, Seventh, or Tenth Circuits, or circuits
adopting the rule of those circuits, the defendant would have faced at least
the possibility of receiving concurrent sentences. To the extent that a judge
in the Second, Third, Seventh, or Tenth Circuits would have elected
concurrent rather than consecutive treatment for the sentences, the defendant
would have spent up to twenty-four fewer months in prison.'55 As a result of
the circuit split, to the extent that the judge in Chapman would have elected
concurrent treatment of the sentences if he could, sentencing disparity
occurred to the detriment of the defendant.
Defendants in white-collar crime cases are particularly prone to being
affected by this circuit split because a significant number of white-collar
defendants receive sentences that at least partially involve terms of probation
or supervised release. 5 6  Further, it is not uncommon for white-collar
defendants to engage in unlawful conduct while on probation, parole, or
supervised release.' 57 Accordingly, the circuit split represents a potentially
significant source of white-collar sentencing disparity.
10. Section 5G1.3 - Federal Sentence "Consecutive" to a Pending State
Sentence
Section 5G1.3 of the Guidelines incorporates by reference Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3584(a). 51 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), a
154. Id. at 61.
155. The sentences ran consecutively, therefore the total time served was fifty-six months (thirty-
two months for bank fraud plus twenty-four months for violation of supervised release). If the
sentences ran concurrently, the total time served would have been thirty-two months, representing
the longer of the two sentences. The difference between the total time served on a consecutive and
concurrent basis was twenty-four months.
156. For example, in the year 2000 approximately forty-nine percent of all defendants sentenced
for crimes involving fraud, embezzlement, or tax charges received sentences that at least partially
included probation or supervised release. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 12 (indicating that
the number of defendants sentenced for fraud, embezzlement, and tax offenses in the year 2000 was
6,174, 912, and 758, respectively (a total of 7,844), and that the number of defendants receiving at
least partial probation or supervised release for fraud, embezzlement, and tax offenses was 2,798,
577, and 442, respectively (a total of 3,817) - the resulting ratio was forty-nine percent).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Steffen, 251 F.3d 1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving a
defendant who committed mail fraud and "travel fraud" while on probation from a prior wire fraud
sentence), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1062 (2001); United States v. Smith, Nos. 98-3794/98-3830, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 34045, at *2-4 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 1999) (involving a defendant who committed
bank fraud in connection with a loan scheme while on supervised release from a prior offense);
Chapman, 241 F.3d at 59-60 (involving a defendant who committed bank fraud while on supervised
release from a prior unrelated offense).
158. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5G1.3, cmt. background. The commentary to Section 5GI.3 states:
"In a case in which a defendant is subject to an undischarged sentence of imprisonment, the court
generally has authority to impose an imprisonment sentence on the current offense to run
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sentence may be imposed to run consecutive to a previous sentence that has
not been fully discharged at the time of sentencing for the instant offense.1
59
The rule has been interpreted to allow a judge to elect consecutive treatment
of a sentence currently imposed by the judge where, at the time of
sentencing, the defendant faces a pending but not-yet-imposed sentence in
another court for unrelated charges. In such circumstances, the judge may
classify the currently imposed sentence as consecutive to the pending
unrelated sentence even though the pending sentence has not yet been
imposed. The effect is to ensure that, if the pending sentence is
subsequently imposed, the two sentences will be served consecutively.
There is disagreement among the circuit courts as to whether the above
stated rule applies to a state sentence that is pending but not yet imposed at
the time of sentencing for a subsequent federal offense.1 60 The Second,
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a federal sentence
may be imposed to run consecutive to a pending but not-yet-imposed state
sentence.'61 In contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held
that a federal sentence cannot be imposed to run consecutive to a pending
but not-yet-imposed state sentence.
62
concurrently with or consecutively to the prior undischarged term." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2001) (stating that "if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a
defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run
concurrently or consecutively").
160. WOOD, supra note 40, at 275.
161. Salley v. United States, 786 F.2d 546, 547 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that a district court may
order a consecutive sentence "regardless of whether the state sentence has as yet been imposed");
United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (stating that a district
court, when determining whether to impose a consecutive sentence, "may consider subsequent
sentences anticipated, but not yet imposed, in separate state court proceedings"); United States v.
Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 798-99 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (stating that the sentencing court has
"the authority to impose ... a federal sentence to be served consecutively to a yet-to-be-imposed
state sentence"); United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57, 59 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating: "We find no
language in section 3584(a) prohibiting a district court from ordering that a federal sentence be
served consecutively to a state sentence that has not yet been imposed"); United States v. Ballard, 6
F.3d 1502, 1510 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding that a federal court has authority to impose a sentence
consecutive to a pending unrelated state sentence).
162. United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038, 1039 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "18 U.S.C. §
3584(a) does not authorize district courts to order a sentence to be served consecutively to a not-yet-
imposed state sentence"); Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that "the district judge ... [may] specify the sequence of service only when ... the other sentence is
'an undischarged term of imprisonment' to which the defendant is 'already subject') (emphasis
added); United States v. Clayton, 927 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the specific
language of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), combined with supporting legislative history, "indicates that
Congress did not vest federal courts with the authority to impose a federal sentence to run
consecutive to a state sentence that has not yet been imposed").
The holding of the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits is
detrimental to defendants because the imposition of a consecutive sentence
by a federal court will prevent a state court from electing concurrent
treatment when the pending state sentence is subsequently imposed.
63
However, it should be noted that the circuit split only has an impact on
sentencing if the federal judge exercises his or her discretion and expressly
elects consecutive treatment for the federal and pending state sentences.
If a federal judge in the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, or Eleventh Circuit
elects not to require consecutive treatment of the sentences, the defendant
will occupy the same position that would have been occupied in the Sixth,
Seventh, or Ninth Circuit. That is, the defendant will have survived federal
sentencing without a mandate that the federal and pending state sentences be
served consecutively, and the defendant will at least face the possibility of
receiving a concurrent sentence from the state court.
To illustrate the issue in the context of white-collar crime, the defendant
in United States v. Romandine 65 was sentenced for credit card fraud while
awaiting sentencing in state court for unrelated state charges. 166 The state
offenses had been committed, but the sentence had not yet been imposed at
the time of sentencing for the federal offenses. 67 Because the court was in
the Seventh Circuit, the trial judge did not have an opportunity to designate
the federal sentence as running consecutive to the pending state sentence. 68
Had the defendant been sentenced in the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, or
Eleventh Circuit, the trial judge would have had an opportunity to elect
consecutive treatment for the federal and pending state sentences. To the
extent that the trial judge would have elected consecutive treatment if he
could, the defendant benefited from the circuit split.
It is not uncommon for defendants of white-collar crimes to be
sentenced for federal charges while awaiting sentencing for pending
unrelated state charges. 69  Such defendants, if sentenced in the Second,
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, or Eleventh Circuits, stand a greater chance of
163. Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1504 ("the imposition of a consecutive sentence.., will prevent the state
court from imposing a concurrent sentence").
164. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), the district court may impose a consecutive sentence, but it is not
required to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2001) (stating that "if a term of imprisonment is imposed on
a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run
concurrently or consecutively") (emphasis added).
165. 206 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2000).
166. Id. at 732.
167. Id.
168. ld. at 737.
169. E.g., Romandine, 206 F.3d at 732-33 (the defendant was sentenced for credit card fraud
while awaiting sentencing for unrelated state charges); United States v. Abro, No. 96-1202, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 15325, at * 1-3 (6th Cir. June 20, 1997) (the defendant was sentenced for money
laundering and food stamp fraud while awaiting sentencing for unrelated state charges).
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receiving consecutive treatment of sentences than if they were sentenced in
the Sixth, Seventh, or Ninth Circuits. Consequently, the circuit split
presents a potentially significant source of white-collar sentencing disparity.
11. Section 5KI. 1 - Court's Ability to Depart From a Sentencing Range
in Absence of a Substantial Assistance Motion from the
Prosecutor
Section 5KI.1 states that "[u]pon motion of the government stating that
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart [downward] from the guidelines."'' 70  Courts generally do not have
authority to depart downward under Section 5KI.1 absent a motion from the
prosecutor.' 7 ' However, prosecutors sometimes withhold Section 5Kl.1
motions in bad faith. 72  With respect to prosecutors withholding Section
5K 1.1 motions in bad faith, a circuit split exists regarding whether the court
may depart from the sentencing range on its own.173
The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits allow a court to depart from a
sentencing range calculated under the Guidelines when a prosecutor
withholds a Section 5K1.1 motion in bad faith. 174 In contrast, the First and
Seventh Circuits strictly adhere to the language of Section 5K1. 1 and do not
allow a departure from a sentencing range absent a government motion, even
if the motion is withheld by a prosecutor in bad faith. 75  The result of the
170. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5Kl.I. Substantial assistance relates to assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of individuals other than the defendant. Id.; id at cmt. n.2.
171. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) (holding that a government motion is a
prerequisite to a Section 5Kl.1 downward departure, unless the motion is withheld by the prosecutor
for unconstitutional reasons).
172. See infra notes 174-75 (illustrating cases acknowledging that prosecutors might withhold a
Section 5K1.1 motion in bad faith).
173. WOOD, supra note 40, at 436-38.
174. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 260 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a prosecutor's
"refusal to move for a departure under Guidelines § 5Kl.1 is reviewable... for misconduct, bad
faith, or an unconstitutional motive, such as the defendant's race or religion"); United States v.
Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "a district court has authority to depart
downward for substantial assistance when the government's refusal to offer a motion is 'attributable
to bad faith"') (quoting United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 1998)); United States v.
Rounsavall, 128 F.3d 665, 667 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[r]elief may be granted absent a
government substantial assistance motion if a defendant shows that the government's refusal to
make the motion was.., withheld in bad faith") (quoting United States v. Kelly, 18 F.3d 612, 617-
18 (8th Cir. 1990)).
175. United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The simple, unvarnished fact
remains that, without a government motion, a sentencing court cannot depart downward under
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circuit split is that a defendant who provides substantial assistance to
authorities, but is denied a Section 5Kl.1 motion in bad faith, will be
deprived of a departure in the First or Seventh Circuits, or a circuit adopting
-the holding of those circuits, but not in the Second, Third, or Eighth Circuits,
or a circuit adopting the holding of those circuits.
Defendants in white-collar crime cases provide substantial assistance to
authorities rather frequently.' 76 Further, it is not uncommon for defendants
in white-collar crime cases to allege that the prosecutor withheld a Section
5Kl.1 motion in bad faith.117  Substantial assistance departures, when
granted in white-collar crime cases, result in an average downward departure
length of approximately ten months.1 78 To the extent that a defendant may
be deprived of a Section 5K1.1 downward departure in some circuits, but not
in others, the circuit split presents a potentially significant source of white-
collar sentencing disparity.
It should be noted that if the opportunity for a downward departure
under Section 5KI.1 is lost, whether due to the bad faith of a prosecutor or
otherwise, the opportunity for a downward departure under Section 5K2.0 179
is gained. 80  However, there are at least two differences between Sections
U.S.S.G. § 5KIl., despite meanspiritedness, or even arbitrariness, on the government's part.");
United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a sentencing court need not
review a prosecutor's refusal to submit a Section 5KII motion, even where "failure of the
prosecutor to make a motion is arbitrary or in bad faith").
176. For example, downward departures for substantial assistance under Section 5KI.I were
granted in approximately seventeen percent of all fraud-related cases in the year 2000. See 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 27 (noting that substantial assistance departures were granted in
1,084 fraud-related cases in the year 2000); id. at tbl. 3 (noting that there were 6,286 fraud-related
cases in the year 2000).
177. E.g., United States v. Ales, No. 99-1316, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 819, at *1-4 (2d Cir. Jan.
21, 2001) (involving a defendant who was charged with filing false tax returns and making false
statements to the Social Security Administration who claimed that the prosecutor withheld a Section
5K1.1 motion in bad faith); United States v. Pileggi, No. CRIM.A.97-612-2, 2000 WL 298976, at *1-
2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2000) (involving a defendant who was convicted of insider trading and wire
fraud who claimed that the prosecutor withheld a Section 5KI.1 motion in bad faith).
178. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 30 (noting that median decreases from the
sentencing range in cases involving fraud, embezzlement, and tax offenses, were ten months, six
months, and twelve months, respectively).
179. Section 5K2.0 states:
[T]he sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the
applicable guidelines, if the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described."
U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
180. United States v. Kaye, 140 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1998). In addressing the interrelationship
between Sections 5K2.0 and 5K 1.1, the court stated:
It is ... clear that if assistance to ... authorities is covered by Section 5KI.1, then the
district court lacks the power to downwardly depart on that basis under Section 5K2.0;
conversely, if such assistance is not addressed by Section 5KI .1 then the district court
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5Kl.1 and 5K2.0 that indicate Section 5Kl.1 is a more favorable departure
basis for defendants.
The first difference is that a downward departure for providing
substantial assistance to authorities is generally more difficult to obtain
under Section 5K2.0 than under Section 5Kl.1.' 8' Specifically, to qualify
for a departure under Section 5K2.0, as opposed to Section 5Kil.1, a
defendant must meet the high burden of showing "'that he offered assistance
that is so unusual in type or degree as to take it out of the heartland of §
5Kl cases."",182 Thus, a defendant faces greater obstacles in obtaining a
departure under Section 5K2.0 than under Section 5Kl.l. Accordingly,
Section 5K2.0 is a less favorable departure basis for defendants.
The second difference is that Section 5KlI.1 permits a court to depart
below a statutory minimum sentence. 83 In contrast, Section 5K2.0 does not
permit a departure below a statutory minimum sentence.' 84 In this regard,
Section 5KlI.1 is a more favorable departure basis for defendants. To
illustrate, in United States v. Gamble,'85 the defendant provided assistance to
authorities and was granted a Section 5Kl.1 downward departure.'86 The
departure resulted in a sentence below the statutory minimum for the offense
of conviction.'87 Had the departure been granted under Section 5K2.0, the
sentence would not have been reduced below the statutory minimum. Thus,
the defendant benefited from receiving a departure under Section 5KI.1
rather than 5K2.0.
can depart under Section 5K2.0 on the basis of such assistance ....
Id.
181. See United States v. Brown, No. 00-2579, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8108, at *2-3 (7th Cir.
Apr. 26, 2001) (noting that a substantial assistance departure under Section 5K2.0 requires a higher
degree of assistance to authorities than a departure under Section 5KI. 1).
182. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Santoyo, 146 F.3d 519, 526 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1998)).
183. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5KI.1, cmt. n.1 (stating that "substantial assistance... may justify
a sentence below a statutorily required minimum sentence").
184. United States .v. Santiago, 201 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that "a District Court
lacks the authority to lower a mandatory minimum sentence via section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines").
185. 917 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1990).
186. Id. at 1282.
187. Id. at 1281-82. The defendant was sentenced for drug charges. Id. The sentence was ninety-
six months despite a statutory minimum of 120 months. Id. While Gamble involved drug charges,
departures below the statutory minimum also occur in cases involving white-collar crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brechner, No. CR 93-626, 1995 WL 804580, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995)
(involving a defendant charged with tax evasion who entered into a plea agreement providing for a
Section 5KI.1 departure that permitted a sentence "below any applicable [statutory] mandatory
minimum sentence"), rev 'd on other grounds, 99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
To summarize, the circuit split regarding the withholding of a Section
5Kl.1 motion in bad faith by prosecutors deprives defendants in certain
circuits of the opportunity to obtain a downward departure. However,
deprived defendants may seek an alternative departure under Section
5K2.0."' In the context of providing substantial assistance to authorities,
Section 5K2.0 is a less favorable departure basis for defendants because a
departure under Section 5K2.0 is more difficult to obtain and in some
instances does not allow for as significant a departure as Section 5Kl.1. 89
Accordingly, as a result of the circuit split, defendants of white-collar crimes
may face materially different sentences depending on the circuit in which
they are convicted.
12. Section 5K1.1 - Substantial Assistance to State Authorities
The Section 5K1.1 downward departure for providing substantial
assistance to authorities applies when a defendant provides assistance to
federal authorities.' 90 However, a circuit split exists regarding whether the
departure also applies when a defendant provides assistance to state
authorities. 91
The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that a downward departure may
be granted for substantial assistance provided to state authorities.
92
Although less clear, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits appear to have held this
way as well.'93 In contrast, the Second Circuit has held that a downward
departure may not be granted for substantial assistance provided to state
authorities.194 The result of the circuit split is that a defendant who provides
188. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (noting that if the opportunity for a departure
under Section 5K 1.1 is lost, the opportunity for a departure under Section 5K2.0 is gained).
189. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between
departures under Sections 5K1.1 and 5K2.0).
190. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (quoting the text of Section 5KI.I); United States
v. Kaye, 140 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Section 5KI.I addresses assistance... to federal
authorities").
191. WOOD, supra note 40, at 426.
192. United States v. Love, 985 F.2d 732, 734-35 (3d Cir. 1993) ("There is no indication in the
language of § 5KI.I or in the accompanying commentary that the Commission meant to limit
'assistance to authorities' to assistance to federal authorities.... [Section] 5KI.l applies to
assistance to state as well as federal authorities."); United States v. Emery, 34 F.3d 911, 913 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhere is no indication in the guidelines or elsewhere that application of section 5K1.1
is limited to assistance to federal authorities in the investigation of federal crimes. Federal courts
regularly have applied section 5KI.1 to instances in which a defendant has assisted state and local
authorities.").
193. United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1990) (assuming without discussion that
Section 5KI.1 applies to assistance to state authorities); United States v. Hill, 911 F.2d 129, 131 (8th
Cir. 1990) (same), vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1226 (1991).
194. Kaye, 140 F.3d at 87 (stating that "the term 'offense' in Section 5KI.1 is properly interpreted
to refer only to federal offenses[,] and... Section 5KI1 addresses assistance only to federal
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substantial assistance to state authorities may receive a downward departure
in the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, or a circuit adopting the
holding of those circuits, but not in the Second Circuit, or a circuit adopting
the holding of the Second Circuit.
Substantial assistance by defendants is common in cases involving
white-collar crime.' 95 Further, it is not uncommon for defendants in white-
collar crime cases to provide substantial assistance to state authorities. 196
Defendants providing assistance to state authorities in the Second Circuit, or
a circuit following the holding of the Second Circuit, are disadvantaged
because they are deprived of an opportunity to earn a Section 5KlI.1
downward departure. Section 5K 1.1 departures, when granted in the context
of a fraud-related offense, result in an average departure length of
approximately ten months.' 97  Therefore, the circuit split leads to less
favorable treatment for certain defendants. Although a Section 5K2.0
departure may be available as an alternative to a Section 5Kli.1 departure,'98
Section 5K2.0 departures are generally more difficult to obtain than Section
5KI.1 departures and do not allow for as significant a departure as Section
5Kl.1.' 99 Accordingly, as a result of the circuit split, defendants of white-
collar crimes may face materially different sentences depending on which
circuit they are convicted in. The circuit split presents a potentially
significant source of white-collar sentencing disparity.
B. Duty of the Commission to Resolve Circuit Splits
The Commission has been authorized to resolve sentencing-related
circuit splits as they arise.z 0 In Braxton v. United States,2 ' the Supreme
Court acknowledged the Commission's power in this regard, stating that "in
charging the Commission 'periodically [to] review and revise' the
authorities").
195. See supra note 176 (illustrating that substantial assistance departures were granted in
seventeen percent of all fraud-related cases in the year 2000).
196. E.g., United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1999) (involving a defendant convicted
of bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy who cooperated with state law
enforcement agencies).
197. See supra note 178 (citing data from the Commission).
198. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (noting that if the opportunity for a departure
under Section 5KI.1 is lost, the opportunity for a departure under Section 5K2.0 is gained).
199. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between
departures under Sections 5K1.1 and 5K2.0).
200. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
201. 500U.S.344(1991).
Guidelines, Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would
periodically review the work of the courts, and would make whatever
clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might
suggest. 20 2  The Supreme Court has also stated that it will be more
"restrained and circumspect in using our certiorari power as the primary
means of resolving such conflicts.,
203
The Commission has addressed circuit splits in the past by issuing
annual amendments to the Guidelines. °4 However, while numerous circuit
splits have indeed been resolved,2 °5 many circuit splits continue to remain.
In fact, most of the present circuit splits identified in this Comment have
been outstanding for several years.206 This perhaps indicates that the
Commission should increase its efforts to resolve conflicting judicial
interpretations regarding the Guidelines.20 7
Each of the circuit splits identified in this Comment represents a source
of white-collar sentencing disparity. The effect of the circuit splits is that a
defendant convicted of a white-collar crime in one court might receive a
materially different sentence than if convicted in another court. This result
is in direct conflict with the goal of the Commission to reduce sentencing
disparity. 208 The Commission is the primary entity responsible for resolving
circuit splits regarding Guideline issues. 2 9  Therefore, if the Commission
fails to act, the splits of authority are likely to remain unresolved. To meet
the goal of reducing white-collar sentencing disparity, it is recommended
that the Commission amend the Guidelines with clarifying language where
necessary to eliminate circuit splits and help maintain consistent sentencing
practices throughout the country.
202. Id. at 348 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)),
203. Id.
204. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C (containing all amendments from 1987 to 2001),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2001guid/TABCON0l.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file
with author); U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, sec. 5 (stating that "[t]he Commission ... can
amend the guidelines each year").
205. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (acknowledging that amendments were
enacted in 2001 to resolve several circuit splits regarding the calculation of "loss" under the
Guidelines).
206. See supra notes 41, 43, 51, 54, 73-74, 87-88, 96-97, 107-08, 119-20, 135, 139, 147-48, 161-
62, 174-75, 192, 193 (indicating, among other things, the dates of the court opinions establishing the
current circuit splits).
207. See Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet
the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 303 n.16 (1994) (noting that "[j]udges, academics, and
practicing lawyers continue to criticize the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the United States
Sentencing Commission for a variety of reasons including failure to reduce disparity, [and] failure to
respond to judicial suggestions for amendments").
208. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of reducing sentencing
disparity).
209. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (noting the view of the Supreme Court with
respect to resolving sentencing-related conflicts of authority).
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Circuit splits are one source of sentencing disparity that can be
controlled by the Commission. However, there are a number of additional
sources of disparity that are less controllable by the Commission. These
include: (i) fact-intensive "adjustments" and "departures" incorporated into
the Guidelines; (ii) discretionary sentencing habits of judges; and (iii)
discretionary practices of prosecutors. The analysis now shifts to these
sources of white-collar sentencing disparity.
IV. ADJUSTMENTS AND DEPARTURES
The Guidelines are designed to account for many factors surrounding a
particular criminal act. Much more information is considered than just the
statute of conviction. Under the Guidelines, "adjustments" to an offense
level and "departures" from a sentencing range allow for customization of a
sentence based on the unique circumstances surrounding the case. 1 °
Adjustments and departures directly impact the length of a sentence
imposed.2 1' Therefore, even under a Guideline system established to
promote uniformity in sentencing and avoid disparity, it is possible that two
defendants who commit identical crimes may receive materially different
sentences. This leads to sentencing disparity by design. However, to the
extent that judges interpret the Guidelines differently, or apply the
Guidelines to the facts in different ways, unintended sentencing disparity
may result.
21 2
210. United States v. Gerard, 782 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The court stated:
Despite the "widespread but serious misconception" that the promulgation of the
Guidelines enjoined sentencing courts from considering personal characteristics of the
offender (citation omitted), "it was not Congress' aim to straitjacket a sentencing court,
compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines' glass bubble, and
preventing it from exercising its discretion, flexibility or independent judgment."
Id. (quoting United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1990)). Further, United States District
Court Judge Patti B. Saris has stated: "I believe that the Supreme Court in the recent case of Koon v.
United States has sent a strong message reaffirming the traditional discretion of the sentencing
district court to individualize sentencing where warranted." Saris, supra note 27, at 1029.
"[D]epartures under [the Guidelines] ... are primarily a 'fine-tuning' of the Guidelines so that
different defendants are treated differently based on offender characteristics." Id. at 1043. "As Koon
recognized, departures beyond the guideline ranges provide sentencing courts with the flexibility of
promoting the express congressional goal of enhancing 'the individualization of sentences' and
permit the consideration of certain personal factors in the atypical case. These departures create
warranted sentencing disparities ..... Id. at 1043-44 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-53 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235-36, 1983 WL 25404).
211. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of the Guidelines).
212. Cory, supra note 9, at 436-37. "The guidelines do not eliminate disparity. Even among
judges[,] ... human beings interpret facts differently. Further, as long as the guidelines present a
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A. Standard of Review
In Koon v. United States,21 3 the Supreme Court established the rule that
the federal courts of appeals must review a district court's application of the
Guidelines to the facts using an "abuse of discretion" standard.1 This
standard of review applies to the decision to invoke both adjustments and
departures. 215  As a result of this highly deferential standard, sentencing
judges have considerable leeway in applying the Guidelines.
The Court in Koon noted that "Congress directed courts of appeals to
'give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts."' 216 This deference appears to be alive and well, as evidenced by the
fact that most sentencing decisions are affirmed on appeal.2 7  As a
consequence, although similar cases might involve similar facts, sentencing
results may vary considerably between judges and still be upheld at the
appellate level.211  Essentially, case law regarding the invocation of
adjustments and departures in different factual settings provides "little more
than broad outer ranges within which district courts can operate freely.",
2
'
9
B. Adjustment to the Offense Level
The Guidelines contain eleven separate and distinct grounds for
adjustment to a given offense level. 220  Relevant in the context of white-
degree of complexity, they will be subject to misinterpretation." Id.
213. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
214. Id. at 91, 96-98; United States v. King, 257 F.3d 1013, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We... review
application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.") (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 91).
However, it should be noted that legal questions regarding interpretation of the Guidelines are
reviewed at the more detailed "de novo" standard. Koon, 518 U.S. at 100; King, 257 F.3d at 1024
("We review interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo ....").
215. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-100; United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1579 (8th Cir. 1996)
("We consider the district court's determination of whether a[n] ... adjustment is appropriate for an
abuse of discretion.") (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100); United States v. Vasquez, 279 F.3d 77, 79
(1 st Cir. 2002) ("Appellate review of a sentencing court's decision granting a departure is for abuse
of discretion.") (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-100).
216. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)). The court further stated that "[i]t has
been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every
convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue." Id. at 113.
217. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at fig. M. For example, in the year 2000, approximately
seventy-nine percent of sentencing-related cases that were appealed were affirmed in full. Id.
Another six percent were affirmed at least in part. Id.
218. Tobin, supra note 84, at 1083 ("Depending on the particular facts of a case, results may vary
within a particular district and still be upheld at the appellate level. This variance results from the
appellate courts' application of the clearly erroneous standard of review .... and the 'fact-specific'
orientation of [the Guidelines].") (discussing sentencing disparity in the context of drug couriers).
219. Id. at 1072 (concluding that "[tihe result of this deference is widespread [sentencing]
disparity").
220. The adjustments are: § 3AL.I, Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim; § 3AI.2,
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collar crime include the following: Section 3Al.1, Vulnerable Victim;
221
Section 3AI.2, Official Victim; 222 Section 3B1.1, Aggravating Role;
223
Section 3B1.2, Mitigating Role; 224 Section 3B1.3, Abuse of Position of Trust
or Use of Special Skill; 225 Section 3C1.1, Obstructing or Impeding the
Administration of Justice; 26  and Section 3E1.1, Acceptance of
Responsibility.2
27
The impact an adjustment has on a given sentence is dictated by the
mechanics of the Guidelines. 28 To illustrate, a Section 3C1.1 adjustment for
obstructing or impeding the administration of justice triggers a two-level
increase in the offense level for the offense of conviction. 229 The sentencing
range on the Sentencing Table therefore increases by two levels and the
sentencing range increases accordingly.23° Judges have no discretion in
determining the degree to which an adjustment will impact a sentence
because the extent of the adjustment (i.e. one level, two levels, etc.) is
expressly stated in the Guidelines. 231' However, judges do have discretion in
Official Victim; § 3A1.3, Restraint of Victim; § 3AI.4, Terrorism; § 3B1.1, Aggravating Role; §
3B1.2, Mitigating Role; § 3B1.3, Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill; § 3BI.4, Using
a Minor to Commit a Crime; § 3C1.1, Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice; §
3C1.2, Reckless Endangerment During Flight; and § 3E1.l, Acceptance of Responsibility. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 8, at ch. 3, pts. A-C, E.
221. See supra note 82 (illustrating instances in which vulnerable victims were harmed in white-
collar crime cases).
222. E.g., United States v. Campbell, No. 00-1715, 2000 WL 1617926, at *2 (8th Cir. 2000)
(imposing a Section 3A 1.2 adjustment in a case involving a defendant charged with mail fraud).
223. E.g., United States v. Hetherington, 256 F.3d 788, 791, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1050 (2001) (imposing a Section 3B1.1 adjustment in a case involving a defendant charged
with securities fraud and wire fraud).
224. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (illustrating an instance in which a Section
3B 1.2 adjustment was sought in a case involving bank fraud).
225. See supra note 103 (illustrating instances in which Section 3B1.3 adjustments were sought in
cases involving various white-collar crimes).
226. E.g., United States v. Luca, 183 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir. 1999) (imposing a Section
3C 1.1 .adjustment in a case involving a defendant charged with securities fraud and mail fraud).
227. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (illustrating an instance in which a Section
3 El I adjustment was sought in a case involving tax fraud).
228. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of the Guidelines).
229. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3C1.1.
230. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table); see also supra note 81
(acknowledging that a two-level upward adjustment can increase the low end of the sentencing range
by sixty-eight months).
231. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3Al.l(b)(l)-(2) (upward adjustment of two or four levels,
depending on the facts of the case); id § 3A 1.2 (upward adjustment of three levels); id § 3B 1.1(a)-
(c) (upward adjustment of two to four levels, depending on the facts of the case); id. § 3B1.2
(downward adjustment of two to four levels, depending on the facts of the case); id. § 3B1.3 (upward
adjustment of two levels); id. § 3C1.1 (upward adjustment of two levels); id § 3EI.I (downward
deciding whether the adjustment should be imposed.232 This is where the
potential for sentencing disparity exists.
Sentencing judges must determine whether the underlying facts of a
case warrant an adjustment.3 3  In making this determination, judges have
considerable discretion in weighing and interpreting the facts. 2 34  An
inherent risk of their discretion is that two judges reviewing identical fact
patterns might arrive at different conclusions regarding the need for an
adjustment. 235 To the extent this occurs, sentencing disparity results.
Adjustments can and do have a significant impact on the length of a
sentence.236 Thus, inconsistencies in the manner in which adjustments are
invoked by different judges constitute a material source of white-collar
sentencing disparity.
C. Departure from the Sentencing Range
Once a sentencing range is determined under the Guidelines, a judge
may depart above or below the calculated range. 237 The Guidelines contain
twenty-one separate and distinct grounds for departure. 238  Relevant in the
context of white-collar crime are the following: Section 5K.1, Substantial
Assistance to Authorities; 239  Section 5K2.3, Extreme Psychological
adjustment of two or three levels, depending on the facts of the case).
232. McCarthy, 97 F.3d at 1579 (recognizing that district courts have discretion in making a
"determination of whether a[n] ... adjustment is appropriate") (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100).
233. United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The basic theory behind the
sentencing guidelines is that, in the ordinary case, the judge will apply the guidelines, make such
interim adjustments as the facts suggest, compute a sentencing range, and then impose a sentence
within that range.") (emphasis added).
234. McCarthy, 97 F.3d at 1579 ("We consider the district court's determination of whether
a[n]... adjustment is appropriate for an abuse of discretion.") (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100).
235. See supra note 212; accord Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of
Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 347 (2000)
(acknowledging a willingness by judges to "fudge the facts" to achieve desired sentencing results).
236. See supra note 81 (acknowledging that a two-level upward adjustment can increase the low
end of the sentencing range by sixty-eight months).
237. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, sec. 4(b) (discussing the general departure policy of
the Guidelines).
238. The departures are: § 5KIl., Substantial Assistance to Authorities; § 5K2.1, Death; § 5K2.2,
Physical Injury; § 5K2.3, Extreme Psychological Injury; § 5K2.4, Abduction or Unlawful Restraint;
§ 5K2.5, Property Damage or Loss; § 5K2.6, Weapons and Dangerous Instrumentalities; § 5K2.7,
Disruption of Governmental Function; § 5K2.8, Extreme Conduct; § 5K2.9, Criminal Purpose; §
5K2.10, Victim's Conduct; § 5K2.11, Lesser Harms; § 5K2.12, Coercion and Duress; § 5K2.13,
Diminished Capacity; § 5K2.14, Public Welfare; § 5K2.16, Voluntary Disclosure of Offense; §
5K2.17, High-Capacity, Semiautomatic Firearms; § 5K2.18, Violent Street Gangs; § 5K2.20,
Aberrant Behavior; § 5K2.21, Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct; and § 5K2.0, Grounds for
Departure (a general provision). U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. K.
239. E.g., United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 936
(2001) (granting a Section 5KI.I departure for a defendant convicted of bank fraud); United States
v. Butler, No. 00-4840, No. 00-4909, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 14569, at *1, 5 (4th Cir. June 29, 2001)
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Injury; 240 Section 5K2.5, Property Damage or Loss; 4' Section 5K2.7,
Disruption of Government Function;242 Section 5K2.8, Extreme Conduct;
43
Section 5K2.9, Criminal Purpose;2 44  Section 5K2.12, Coercion and
Duress;145  Section 5K2.13, Diminished Capacity;2 46  Section 5K2.16,
Voluntary Disclosure of Offense;247 and a general provision at Section 5K2.0
entitled Grounds for Departure.248
(granting a Section 5KI . departure for a defendant convicted of computer fraud).
240. E.g., United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 251 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1100
(2001) (granting a Section 5K2.3 departure for a defendant convicted of embezzling funds from a
pension plan); United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1054 (3d Cir. 1991) (granting a Section
5K2.3 departure for a defendant convicted of tax evasion and wire fraud); United States v. Benskin,
926 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1991) (granting a Section 5K2.3 departure for a defendant convicted of
securities fraud involving a Ponzi scheme).
241. E.g., United States v. Flinn, 987 F.2d 1497, 1498, 1505 (10th Cir. 1993) (granting a Section
5K2.5 departure for a defendant charged with fraudulently obtaining the use of a long distance
telephone access code); United States v. Perkins, 929 F.2d 436, 437-38 (8th Cir. 1991) (granting a
Section 5K2.5 departure for a defendant charged with credit card fraud and wire fraud).
242. E.g., United States v. Gunby, 112 F.3d 1493, 1502-03 (11 th Cir. 1997) (granting a Section
5K2.7 departure for a Magistrate who embezzled funds from a county court system); United States
v. Khan, 53 F.3d 507, 518 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting a Section 5K2.7 departure for a defendant
charged with defrauding Medicaid); United States v. Heckman, 30 F.3d 738, 742-43 (6th Cir. 1994)
(granting a Section 5K2.7 departure for a defendant charged with income tax fraud); United States v.
Root, 12 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (granting a Section 5K2.7 departure for a defendant
convicted of wire fraud and forging public records while practicing as an attorney before the FCC);
United States v. Hatch, 926 F.2d 387, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1991) (granting a Section 5K2.7 departure for
a defendant charged with unauthorized use of funds from a police department's general fund).
243. E.g., United States v. Davis, 170 F.3d 617, 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1999) (granting a Section
5K2.8 departure for a defendant convicted of wire fraud in connection with a telemarketing scheme);
United States v. Jacobson, No. 92-5406, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22534, at *5, 14-15 (4th Cir. Sep. 3,
1993) (granting a Section 5K2.8 departure for a defendant convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud
involving a scheme to defraud medical patients).
244. E.g., United States v. Prine, No, 01-4094, 2001 WL 822449, at *2 (4th Cir. July 20, 2001)
(granting a Section 5K2.9 departure for a defendant convicted of bank fraud).
245. E.g., United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 570-71 (6th Cir. 1995) (granting a Section 5K2.12
departure for a defendant convicted of bank fraud in a check kiting scheme).
246. E.g., United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (granting a Section 5K2.13
departure for a defendant convicted of computer fraud); United States v. Lewinson, 988 F.2d 1005,
1006 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting a Section 5K2.13 departure for a defendant convicted of mail fraud in
connection with receiving fraudulent reimbursements from the state).
247. E.g., United States v. Gerard, 782 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (considering a Section
5K2.16 departure for a defendant convicted of wire fraud in a scheme to defraud her clients).
248. E.g., United States v. Moskal, 211 F.3d 1070, 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) (granting a Section
5K2.0 departure for a defendant convicted of mail fraud in connection with embezzling funds from
his clients and employer); United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 446, 464 (3d Cir. 1999)
(permitting a Section 5K2.0 departure, subject to findings on remand, in a case involving securities
fraud and wire fraud).
The potential for sentencing disparity caused by departures is two-fold.
First, different judges may arrive at different conclusions as to whether
departures are warranted in a given factual setting.249 Second, once it is
determined that an adjustment is warranted, there are no clear rules
regarding the degree of the departure. 250 As a consequence, different judges
might arrive at different conclusions as to how many months to depart from
a given sentencing range in a given case.
1. Determining Whether a Departure is Warranted
Judges have significant discretion in determining whether the facts of a
given case justify a departure. 251  An inherent risk of this discretion is that
judges may arrive at different departure conclusions in cases with
substantially similar facts.
At least one study has found that tendencies to depart from the
Guidelines do indeed vary between judges.252 Reasons for the variances
were not identified with certainty. One proposition was that the frequency
249. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text (discussing inter-judge disparity in
determining whether departures are warranted); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98
(1996) (acknowledging that a district court's decision as to whether a departure is warranted "will in
most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a
sentencing court").
250. Saris, supra note 27, at 1042. Judge Saris stated:
[M]ost departures are unguided because the magnitude of the departure is not mandated,
or even calibrated by the guidelines. Once a court has decided to depart, generally there is
no formula governing the degree of departure. The appellate courts have no jurisdiction
to review the extent of a downward departure merely because a defendant believes the
court is too parsimonious except if the departure is affected by a mistake of law. Where
the government or defendant believes the magnitude of the departure is excessive,
substantial deference is accorded the sentencing judge's decision to determine whether it
is within the "realm of reason." Upward departures which literally triple the sentence and
downward departures from a range of thirty three months to probation have all been held
to be within the "realm of reason."
Id.
251. See supra note 216 and accompanying text; United States v. Gregory, 932 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1991 ) (stating that "we have no jurisdiction over appeals which argue that the district court
failed to properly weigh certain factors in departing downward").
252. Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1996). The authors stated that
"[wihile the tendencies of individual judges to depart did vary dramatically, we found no clear
ideological or temporal pattern." Id. at 358. The authors concluded that their "findings on white-
collar departure suggest that the Commission should reexamine its approach to white-collar
sentencing." Id. at 365. The study, based on data from 1991 and 1992 sentencing decisions, was
derived from departure patterns of thirty United States District Courts in six circuits. Id. at 303. A
similar conclusion was reached by another author in a study based on 1998 data. Cory, supra note 9,
at 401. The author noted that "[a] defendant in the Northern District of Georgia whose case presents
mitigating circumstances is significantly more likely to receive a sentencing reduction [based on a
downward departure] than a defendant in the Eastern District of Tennessee whose case presents
mitigating circumstances." Id.
500
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with which departures are invoked is to some extent related to the age of
judges. 253 The theory is that judges from the pre-Guidelines era, i.e. judges
on the bench before 1987, utilize greater discretion and are generally more
willing to invoke departures.254 This is because judges from the pre-
Guidelines era tend to remain accustomed to the much more discretionary
sentencing system that was in effect prior to the Guidelines. 25 5 The study
found that courts in districts where sentence length tended to be below the
national average for similar crimes in the pre-Guidelines era were more
likely to invoke downward departures in the post-Guidelines era.256 This
indicates that courts that tended to be less harsh in sentencing before the
Guidelines continue to be less harsh after the Guidelines. Further, data at the
circuit level revealed that different circuits tended to vary substantially in
their general approach to departures.2 57 The case law of some circuits
seemed to encourage departures, the case law of other circuits seemed to
discourage departures, and the case law of other circuits seemed to remain
neutral.258 In addition, large variations existed in departure practice among
district courts within the circuits. 9
The end result of the significant judicial discretion permitted by Koon
appears to be that a departure deemed worthy of application in the eyes of
one judge might not be deemed worthy of application in the eyes of another
judge. 260 To the extent that different judges utilize their departure discretion
253. Gelacak et al., supra note 252, at 357. The author stated that Judge Jack Weinstein, a federal
judge in the Eastern District of New York, "hypothesized that the frequency of departures and
judicial resistance to the Guidelines would gradually diminish as newer judges, with no pre-
Guidelines sentencing experience, were appointed and fewer sentences were imposed by those
[judges] accustomed to the unconstrained authority of the pre-Guidelines era." Id. It has similarly
been said that "[o]lder judges who operated before the guidelines were put in place are particularly
resentful of the rules and formulas" regarding departures from sentencing ranges. Traci Neal, Are
Connecticut's Federal Judges 'Soft on White-Collar Crime?,' CoNN. LAW TRIB., Aug. 2, 1999, at 3.
254. See supra note 253.
255. See supra note 253.
256. Gelacak et al., supra note 252, at 362.
257. Id. at 358. With respect to departures in white-collar crime cases, Judge Guido Calabresi of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that "[t]he Second Circuit has
interpreted the[] [departure] provisions to be somewhat broader and more flexible than some other
courts have." Neal, supra note 253, at 3.
258. Gelacak et al., supra note 252, at 358. For example, the Second Circuit frequently upheld
departures for reasons that other circuits tended to reject, the Seventh Circuit showed just the
opposite trend, and the Eighth Circuit tended to take a balanced or neutral approach to reviewing
departure decisions. Id. at 358-59.
259. Id. at 360.
260. Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:
The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 57, 59-61 (2000) (noting that
in different ways, which indeed appears to occur, a source of sentencing
disparity exists. Consequently, similarly situated defendants convicted of
similar crimes might receive materially different sentences depending on
which judge presides over the case.
2. Degree of the Departure
There are no specific rules regarding the degree of departures, i.e. the
number of months by which a judge may depart from a sentencing range.26'
The standard is simply one of "reasonableness." 262  The decision is a
context-specific inquiry left to the discretion of the judge.263 With such a
subjective standard,2 64 an inherent risk exists that sentencing disparity will
occur.
To illustrate, in United States v. Diaz-Villafane,265 the court of appeals
upheld an upward departure such that the defendant was sentenced to 120
months rather than a sentence within the range of twenty-seven to thirty-
three months as calculated under the Guidelines.266 The upward departure,
based on Section 5K2.0 267 of the Guidelines, was supported by the court's
"offenders in some circuits have received downward departures under circumstances that do not
qualify for departure in other jurisdictions," and concluding that sentencing disparity occurs in part
"because appellate courts have applied Koon differently"); see also Saris, supra note 27, at 1041
(acknowledging that the dissenting opinions in Koon point out that, with respect to factors the
Guidelines neither expressly permit nor prohibit as grounds for departure, appellate courts are likely
to differ as to whether such factors may support a departure in a given case) (citing Koon, 518 U.S.
at 115 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 118-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
261. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K2.0 ("The decision as to whether and to what extent
departure is warranted rests with the sentencing court on a case-specific basis.").
262. E.g., United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that "the degree of
departure must be measured by a standard of reasonableness on appeal"); United States v. Diaz-
Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that "the... degree of departure must, on appeal,
be measured by a standard of reasonableness").
263. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K2.0; Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49-50, 52. The court stated:
[The reasonableness inquiry] involves what is quintessentially a judgment call. District
courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh-and-blood defendants. The dynamics of the
situation may be difficult to gauge from the antiseptic nature of a sterile paper record.
Therefore, appellate review must occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's
superior "feel" for the case. We will not lightly disturb ... decisions implicating degrees
of departure.
[W]e read the Guidelines as envisioning considerable discretion in departure decisions.
Id.
264. See Joan, 883 F.2d at 496 (stating that reasonableness of departure length "is a flexible
standard").
265. 874 F.2d at 43.
266. Id. at 48, 52.
267. Id. at 52. Section 5K2.0 permits a departure where "the court finds 'that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
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conclusion that a number of unique facts took the case out of the heartland
of cases in which the particular offense of conviction was typically
involved. 268  The court of appeals upheld the departure even though it
resulted in a sentence more than three times higher than the high end of the
applicable sentencing range.269  Essentially, the trial court could have
imposed a sentence anywhere from thirty-three months to 120 months. To
the extent that another sentencing judge might have imposed a less extreme
departure under the circumstances, the case illustrates the potential for
sentencing disparity.
Another case illustrates an extreme departure in the context of white-
collar crime. In United States v. Davis,270 the defendant was convicted of
wire fraud in connection with a telemarketing scheme.271' The court of
appeals upheld a departure that resulted in a sentence of 108 months rather
than the thirty-seven to forty-six month range calculated under the
Guidelines. 72 The sentence imposed was more than two times higher than
the high end of the sentencing range. The departure was based on Section
5K2.8 27 3 and was supported by the "cruel" and "degrading" manner in which
the defendant treated his victims. 274 Essentially, in assessing the severity of
the facts, the trial judge could have imposed a sentence anywhere from
forty-six months to 108 months. To the extent that another sentencing judge
might have imposed a less extreme departure under the circumstances, the
case illustrates the potential for sentencing disparity.
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described."' U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)).
268. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 50. The offense of conviction was drug possession. Reasons for
the upward departure included: "(1) defendant's status as an 'important supplier ... to drug addicts
in the ... Puerto Rico area;' (2) the pendency of eight trafficking charges against defendant... ; (3)
defendant's use of 'adolescent or pre-adolescent children' to deliver narcotics; (4) defendant's
involvement in drug ventures that reaped $10,000 - $15,000 daily ... ; and (5) the purity of the
heroin." Id.
269. Id. at 48, 52. For a similar conclusion, see Saris, supra note 27 (acknowledging that upward
departures that triple the sentence, and downward departures from a sentence of thirty-three months
to a sentence of probation, have been upheld on appeal).
270. 170 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 1999).
271. Id. at 620.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 623. Section 5K2.8 permits a departure "[i]f the defendant's conduct was unusually
heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim." U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K2.8 (1999).
274. Davis, 170 F.3d at 623.
3. Frequency of Departures
When enacting the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress believed that
departures from sentencing ranges would be used only in truly exceptional
circumstances. 275  The Guidelines even state that, "despite the courts' legal
freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often., 276
However, departures have become fairly common. For example, departures
occurred in 1,814 fraud-related cases in the year 2000, representing thirty-
one percent of the 5,775 fraud-related cases in the year 2000.277 The median
departure length for these departures was approximately ten months.278
Given the frequency with which departures are invoked, and the significant
discretion judges have to decide how many months to depart from a
sentencing range, departures present a material source of sentencing
disparity.
In summary, sentencing judges have significant discretion in
determining whether departures are warranted and, if so, to what degree to
depart from a sentencing range. This dual discretion, combined with the
relatively high frequency with which departures are invoked, makes
departures under the Guidelines a significant source of white-collar
sentencing disparity.
V. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Judges have the ability to influence sentencing through various other
means in addition to the imposition of adjustments and departures. Most
notably, judges have virtually unlimited discretion to sentence a defendant to
275. See 124 Cong. Rec. 382-383 (1988) (Senator Kennedy stated that "[w]e want to make sure
these guidelines are followed in the great majority of cases," and Senator Hart stated that "the
presumption is that the judge will sentence within the guideline[] [range]"); see also 133 Cong. Rec.
S16644-48 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (Senator Hatch stated: "If the [departure] standard is relaxed,
there is a danger that trial judges will be able to depart from the guidelines too freely, and such
unwarranted departures would undermine the core function of the guidelines.., to reduce
disparity."); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K2.0, cmt. (stating that "the Commission believes
that [departure] cases will be extremely rare") (discussing departures under Section 5K2.0 but not
under other Section 5K provisions).
276. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, sec. 4(b).
277. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 27. There were 1,084 substantial assistance
departures, 669 "other downward" departures, and 61 "upward" departures, for a total of 1,814
departures. Id. One commentator, noting that the frequency with which departures were invoked
increased steadily from the year 1994 to 2000, suggested that the increase might have been due to
judicial attempts to manipulate the Guidelines. Bowman, supra note 235, at 343.
278. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at this. 30-32. The median departure rate for substantial
assistance departures was ten months. Id. at tbl. 30. The median departure rate for "other
downward" departures was nine months. Id. at tbl. 31. The median departure rate for "upward"
departures was twelve months. Id. at tbl. 32.
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any term within a sentencing range calculated under the Guidelines.279
Further, in many cases judges have the authority to substitute at least part of
a defendant's sentence with a variety of non-prison altematives. 28 ° These
discretionary measures can and do lead to different sentences, or at least
different periods of incarceration, for similarly situated white-collar
defendants.2 8'
A. Selecting a Sentence within the Sentencing Range
Once a sentencing range has been calculated, the judge has significant
discretion to select any sentence within that range.282 A sentencing range
can include as few as six months between the high and low end of the range
or as many as eighty-one months, depending on the adjusted offense level
and criminal history category.283 Thus, selecting a point within a sentencing
range has a significant impact on a defendant's overall sentence. The
potential for sentencing disparity exists because judges are virtually unbound
in determining which point to select within a sentencing range.284 There are
very few limitations on the factors a judge may consider when selecting a
sentence within the range. 85 Further, as a practical matter, appellate courts
are often unaware of which factors were relied on by the trial judge when
279. See infra notes 282-89 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
281. See infra note 289; see also Cory, supra note 9, at 437. The author, discussing the results of
a study of sentencing decisions in the Eastern District of Tennessee, stated: "[J]udges' exercise of
discretion results in a certain amount of 'unwarranted' disparity in sentencing. As this study has
shown, different judges will ... impose different sentences on the same defendant for the same
offense."
282. See infra note 288; see also U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § IB 1.4 ("In determining the sentence to
impose within the guideline range,.., the court may consider, without limitation, any information
concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant .. ") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661);
id. § 5C 1.1 ("A sentence conforms with the guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum
and maximum terms of the applicable guideline range.").
283. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table). Lesser offenses result in more
narrow sentencing ranges than serious offenses. Id. For all sentencing ranges, the high end of the
range cannot exceed the low end of the range. by more than the greater of six months or twenty-five
percent. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, §§ 2, 4(h) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000)).
284. See supra note 282.
285. Bowman, supra note 67, at 472 (the author, discussing Sections 5HlI to 5HI.6 of the
Guidelines, noted that a defendant's personal characteristics such as age, mental condition short of
insanity, physical condition, alcohol or drug addiction, education level, employment history, family
responsibilities, and the like are relevant to a judge's choice of sentence within a sentencing range).
The only factors a judge is expressly prohibited from considering are a defendant's "race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status." U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5H 1. 10.
286imposing a sentence within the sentencing range. This is because judges
are required to formally state which factors they relied on only when the
difference between the high and low end of the sentencing range exceeds
twenty-four months.287  Further, even when stating the factors relied on, a
judge's discretion in relying on those factors is virtually unreviewable.2 5
The result of the significant judicial discretion is that, in substantially similar
cases, different judges may arrive at significantly different decisions
regarding which point to select within a sentencing range.289
To illustrate the potential for sentencing disparity, in United States v.
Harris,29 ° the defendant was charged with wire fraud and mail fraud in
connection with misrepresentations made to real estate investors. The
defendant was sentenced to seventy-one months, representing the highest
point within the applicable sentencing range of fifty-seven to seventy-one
months.29' The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, despite
acknowledging a number of factors that could have supported a sentence at a
lower end of the range, including the defendant's "timely plea of guilty at
arraignment, his cooperation with and production of documents.., and his
seeking of therapy for [a] bipolar mental disorder., 292 The court of appeals
also acknowledged that letters seeking a sentence at the low end of the range
were received from the defendant's wife, children, daughter-in-law, mother-
in-law, housekeeper, and friends.293 In upholding the sentence at the high
286. See infra note 287.
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2002); United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990)
("Section 3553(c) explicitly contemplates that the district court need not state its reasons for
imposing [a] sentence at a particular point [within the sentencing range] unless the applicable range
exceeds twenty-four months."). The size of the sentencing range exceeds twenty-four months only if
the low end of the range is one hundred months or higher. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A
(Sentencing Table).
288. E.g., Neary, 183 F.3d at 1198 (stating that "we may not review the district court's decision to
impose a sentence at a particular point within the proper sentencing range"); United States v. Harris,
38 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "the district court's exercise of discretion is generally
unreviewable when it imposes a sentence within a Guideline range"); United States v. Garcia, 919
F.2d 1478, 1481 (10th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that "the general rule [is] that sentences falling
within the Guidelines are not appealable").
289. Hofer et al., supra note 9, at 289 (a statistical analysis revealed that defendants, on average,
can expect their sentences to be approximately eight months longer or shorter due solely to the judge
assigned to the case); Cory, supra note 9, at 433-34 (concluding that "[w]hether a defendant receives
a sentence at the top half or the bottom half of the sentencing guideline range will vary according to
who the judge is," and stating that the reason for this is, in part, because "[s]ome judges take
defendants' personal characteristics into consideration when deciding where within the range to
impose sentence," whereas other judges "focus on details of offense conduct and prior criminal
history").
290. 38 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1994).
291. Id. at 96-97.
292. Id. at 97-98. However, the court also noted several factors in support of a sentence at the
high end of the range. Id.
293. Id. at 97. However, the court also noted that other letters were received seeking a sentence at
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end of the range, the court of appeals stated that "the district court's exercise
of discretion is generally unreviewable when it imposes a sentence within a
Guideline range. 294 Presumably, based on the factors in the defendant's
favor, the trial judge could have imposed a sentence at a much lower point
within the sentencing range. Given the significant deference afforded to trial
courts when selecting a sentence within a sentencing range, such a sentence
would have likely withstood appellate review. Thus, to the extent that a
different sentencing judge might have selected a lower sentence within the
sentencing range, the potential for sentencing disparity existed.
B. Alternatives to Incarceration
When a sentence is imposed, Section 5CI.1 of the Guidelines permits
the judge to determine the manner in which the sentence will be served.
Specifically, in certain situations, judges may impose a sentence of
imprisonment, supervised release, probation, or a combination of the
three.295 However, judges are bound by certain defined limitations in
selecting the sentencing mix. 296  In general, for all cases in which the
minimum sentence in the sentencing range is less than twelve months,
judges have the authority to substitute certain non-prison alternatives for at
least part of the term that would otherwise be served in prison. 297 In cases in
which the minimum sentence in the sentencing range is greater than twelve
months, the minimum term must be satisfied solely by imprisonment.298
the high end of the range. Id.
294. Id.
295. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5C1.1. Supervised release consists of "community confinement" or
"home detention." Id. § 5C1.1(c). Community confinement consists of residence in a "community
treatment center, halfway house, or similar residential facility." Id. § 5C 1.1 (e)(2).
296. The limitations are as follows: If the minimum term in the sentencing range is zero months,
the court may impose a sentence of either imprisonment, probation, or supervised release. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 8, § 5C 1.1(b); id. at cmt. n.2. If the minimum term in the sentencing range is from one to
six months, the sentence may be satisfied by either imprisonment for the entire term, imprisonment
for at least one month with the remainder consisting of supervised release, or probation for the entire
term. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5C1.L(c); id. at cmt. n.3 (A)-(C). If the minimum term in the
sentencing range is from seven to twelve months, the sentence may be satisfied by either
imprisonment for the entire term, or imprisonment for at least half the term of the minimum sentence
with the remainder consisting of supervised release. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5Cl.l(d); id. at cmt.
n.4. Finally, if the minimum term in the sentencing range is twelve or more months, the minimum
sentence must be satisfied solely by imprisonment. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5Cl.l(f); id. at cmt.
n.8.
297. See supra note 296 (discussing limitations in selecting a sentencing mix).
298. See supra note 296 (discussing limitations in selecting a sentencing mix).
To the extent that different judges, districts, or circuits tend to be more
pro-prison than others, two similarly situated defendants sentenced in
different courts could face materially different sentencing mixes.2 99  It
should be noted that this is not a true issue of sentencing disparity, but rather
an issue of imposing more lenient alternatives to incarceration. Section
5CI.1 does not allow a judge to increase or decrease the length of the
sentence; it merely allows a judge to substitute certain non-prison
alternatives for actual incarceration. 300  However, non-prison alternatives
allow defendants to return to society sooner than they would if the sentence
was served solely by incarceration. Freedom of the defendant is greatly
restored under non-prison alternatives. Therefore, the imposition of non-
prison alternatives is viewed as a type of sentencing disparity for purposes of
this Comment.
The Guidelines do not specify which factors a judge may or may not
consider when determining the mix of prison and non-prison alternatives. 30'
299. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 296 (listing the non-prison alternatives to incarceration).
301. The only guidance provided by the Guidelines is the broad statement, applicable to all
sentencing decisions, that "[i]n determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range.., the
court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 1131.4. The
Guidelines have been criticized for providing too little guidance to judges in determining the mix of
prison and non-prison alternatives. See Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
413, 443 (1992) (arguing that the Commission should issue policy statements to "help judges in
deciding whether and how to ... select among different available sanctions."). On the other hand,
courts have recognized that Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a) provides a number of
general factors for judges to consider when determining, among other things, the mix of sentencing
alternatives. United States v. Lively, 20 F.3d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1994). Section 3553(a) states:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence[:] ... The court, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category
of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, and
that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;
[Vol.30: 459, 2003] White Collar Crime
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A study conducted by the Commission in 1995 indicated that factors often
considered by judges in determining the sentencing mix include a
defendant's criminal history, gender, employment status, and disposition
type (trial versus plea).30 2 Neither the Guidelines nor case law provide
specific guidance as to how these nor any other factors should be weighed in
determining the sentencing mix.
30 3
The decision of whether and to what extent a judge may impose non-
prison alternatives is generally not reviewable at the appellate level.
30 4
Further, if the difference between the high and low end of the applicable
sentencing range is less than twenty-four months, the sentencing judge need
not state on the record how or why a given sentencing mix was arrived at.30 5
Thus, the sentencing judge has significant discretion in determining whether
and to what extent to assign non-prison alternatives.
1. Disparity Among Circuits
Disparity between circuits exists regarding the imposition of non-prison
alternatives to incarceration. Commission data indicates that certain circuits
are consistently more willing than others to grant at least partial non-prison
alternatives when the opportunity exists to grant such alternatives. For
example, during the years 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, and 1996, the national
ratio of fraud defendants receiving at least partial non-prison alternatives to
fraud defendants eligible for such alternatives was 64%,306 68%, 307 68%,308
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2001).
302. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STAFF DISCUSSION PAPER: SENTENCING OPTIONS UNDER THE
GUIDELINES, 16-17 (1996) [hereinafter STAFF DISCUSSION PAPER], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/simple/sentopt.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
303. An extensive search of the Westlaw database on October 15, 2002 revealed no judicial
decisions, scholarly works, or other sources addressing the process of assigning weight to sentencing
factors used in determining the mix of prison and non-prison alternatives.
304. United States v. Perakis, 937 F.2d 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1991) ("We do not have jurisdiction
to review a sentencing court's discretionary refusal to impose a substitute detention under Guidelines
section 5C 1.1 (c)(2).").
305. Lively, 20 F.3d at 198 (acknowledging that, where the sentencing range is less than twenty-
four months, the sentencing judge need not state on the record his or her reasons for electing to
impose a term of imprisonment rather than a non-prison alternative) (relying on 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c)).
306. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE tbl. 6 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
JUDPACK/JP2000.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
70%,309 and 68%,31 respectively. 31  The Second and Third Circuits each had
higher ratios than the national average in all five of those years. The ratios
in the Second Circuit were 76%, 82%, 77%, 72%, and 73%, respectively.
3 12
The ratios in the Third Circuit were 71%, 71%, 69%, 80%, and 75%,
respectively. 31 3 This appears to indicate a greater willingness or ability in
the Second and Third Circuits to grant non-prison alternatives as compared
to the rest of the country. In contrast, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits each had
lower ratios than the national average in all five of those years. The ratios in
the Sixth Circuit were 52%, 63%, 65%, 60%, and 57%, respectively. 314 The
ratios in the Eighth Circuit were 62%, 59%, 54%, 65%, and 66%,
respectively.31 5 This appears to indicate a lesser willingness or ability in the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits to grant non-prison alternatives.
2. Reasons for Disparity
Analysis at the circuit level provides at least some indication that
disparity in sentencing habits exists with respect to the imposition of non-
prison alternatives. There appear to be no significant differences among the
circuits in the relative availability of programs or facilities needed to
307. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE tbl. 6 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE], available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/
jpI999.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
308. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE tbl. 6 (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE], available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/
jpI998.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
309. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE tbl. 6 (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE], available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/
jpl997.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
310. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE tbl. 6 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE], available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/
jp1996.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
311. Defendants eligible for non-prison alternatives are those whose sentencing ranges under the
Guidelines have a minimum term of less than twelve months. See supra note 296 (discussing
limitations in selecting non-prison alternatives to incarceration).
312. See supra notes 306-10, at tbl. 6 (data sets for the Second Circuit for the years 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997, and 1996); accord, STAFF DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 302, at 15 (results from a
1995 study indicated that defendants in the Northeast region of the United States were approximately
nine percent more likely to receive non-prison sentences than were defendants in other regions).
313. See supra notes 306-10, at tbl. 6 (data sets for the Third Circuit for the years 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997, and 1996); accord, STAFF DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 302, at 15 (results from a
1995 study indicated that defendants in the Northeast region of the United States were approximately
nine percent more likely to receive non-prison sentences than were defendants in other regions).
314. See supra notes 306-10, at tbl. 6 (data sets for the Sixth Circuit for the years 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997, and 1996).
315. See supra notes 306-10, at tbl. 6 (data sets for the Eighth Circuit for the years 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997, and 1996).
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administer non-prison alternatives.316 Moreover, there appear to be no
differences in substantive law among the circuits that would affect the
sentencing habits of judges when imposing non-prison alternatives.317
Rather, the more likely scenario is that disparity in sentencing mixes is
caused in large part by differences in the individual preferences of
sentencing judges.31 8
Reasons for disparity in sentencing mixes imposed by judges are two-
fold. First, judges have significant discretion in weighing the facts of each
case and in determining whether the facts warrant non-prison alternatives.31 9
Appellate courts generally lack authority to review the determination of
whether and to what extent non-prison alternatives should be imposed.32°
Therefore, facts warranting non-prison alternatives in the eyes of one judge
might not warrant non-prison alternatives in the eyes of another. Under the
Guidelines, either judge's conclusion is likely acceptable.
Second, individual judges tend to develop general personal preferences
for or against non-prison alternatives. 321 In this respect, some judges tend to
impose non-prison alternatives more frequently than other judges on the
basis of personal habit or belief in the effectiveness of particular sentencing
alternatives. As a consequence, similarly situated defendants convicted in
different courts might receive materially different sentencing mixes
depending on which judge presides over the case rather than on the
underlying facts of the case.
316. STAFF DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 302, at 15. A study conducted by the Commission in
1995 found that there were generally adequate numbers of community confinement facilities and
home confinement programs throughout the country to manage offenders who qualified for such
programs. id. The authors concluded that "[i]n summary, availability does not appear to be the
primary reason judges do not often impose the least restrictive alternative sentence permitted under
the guidelines." Id.
317. This conclusion was reached after several hours of research and discussions with federal
prosecutors.
318. Interview with Pamela L. Johnston, a federal prosecutor in Los Angeles (Jan. 25, 2002) (the
view expressed by Ms. Johnston is her personal view and does not represent the view of the
Department of Justice or the United States Attorney's Office); see also Hofer et al., supra note 9, at
250 (acknowledging that there are both liberal and conservative judges, and that liberal judges tend
to rely more on non-prison alternatives such as probation while conservative judges tend to be more
punishment-oriented). Further, a 1988 study found that "prior experience as a prosecutor, as well as
the judge's religion, were significantly related to the use of incarceration as opposed to probation."
Id. at 252.
319. Lively, 20 F.3d at 199 (stating that findings of fact underlying a court's selection of
sentencing alternatives under Section 5C 1.1 are reviewed on appeal under the "clearly erroneous"
standard) (quoting United States v. Duque, 883 F.2d 43, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1989)).
320. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
In summary, some judges weigh sentencing factors differently than
other judges in determining whether and to what extent to impose non-
prison alternatives. Also, some judges view non-prison alternatives as more
effective or otherwise more attractive than other judges view the same
alternatives. In any event, due to the significant discretion afforded to
judges, white-collar sentencing disparity exists with respect to the
imposition of non-prison alternatives to incarceration.
VI. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Prosecutorial discretion has a considerable impact on the sentence
imposed upon a defendant. Three important areas of prosecutorial discretion
that have an effect on the sentencing of white-collar criminals are the
decision of: (i) which charges to bring, (ii) whether to seek a downward
departure for substantial assistance to authorities under Section 5K1.1 of the
Guidelines, and (iii) whether and to what extent to enter into a plea
agreement. Each of these areas of discretion is a source of white-collar
sentencing disparity.
A. Charging Decisions
Charging decisions are a critical sentencing matter and are left solely to
the discretion of the prosecutor.322 When determining which charges to
bring, prosecutors may often choose from more than one statutory offense.
For example, when a defendant lies to cover up a crime, the prosecutor may
charge the defendant with either false statements to authorities or obstruction
of justice.323 False statements to authorities carry a base sentence of zero to
six months for a defendant with a criminal history category of one.324 In
322. United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that "the
Guidelines do not give courts the authority to interfere with a prosecutor's exercise of discretion in
charging [defendants]"); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1437 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
that "[c]harging decisions are primarily a matter of discretion for the prosecution"); Ellen S. Podgor,
The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L.. REV.
1511, 1516, 1520 (2000) (acknowledging the legality of wide prosecutorial discretion in determining
which charges to bring) (citing United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1332 (1 Ith Cir. 1998));
Chris Zimmerman, Prosecutorial Discretion, 89 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1230-31 nn.636-37 (2001)
(discussing the freedom prosecutors have in bringing charges).
323. Michael Higgins, Sizing Up Sentences, 85 A.B.A. J. 42, 44 (Nov. 1999). Making false
statements in this context is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 6
F.3d 692, 693 (10th Cir. 1993) (making false statements to the FBI during an investigation was a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001). Obstruction ofjustice is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
324. Making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is sentenced under Section 2B1.1 of
the Guidelines. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. A (Statutory Index). The base offense level for an
offense sentenced under Section 2B1.1 is six. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2B1.l(a). The sentencing
range for a defendant with an offense level of six and a criminal history category of one is zero to six
months. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table). Even with a two-level upward
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contrast, obstruction of justice carries a base sentence of ten to sixteen
months for a defendant with a criminal history category of one.325 Elements
of the two offenses are similar, and the same evidence is often sufficient to
prove either charge.326 Thus, where a defendant's conduct is capable of
supporting either of multiple similar charges, the defendant's sentencing fate
is essentially left to the prosecutor.
As another example, money laundering charges may be added to many
white-collar crimes. 3 27 Money laundering is the crime of "transferring
illegally obtained [funds] through legitimate persons or accounts so that its
original source cannot be traced. 32 8  Money laundering is a particularly
applicable charge where fraud is involved because fraud schemes often
involve the transfer of funds to conceal the source of the funds.32 9 Money
laundering charges may increase a defendant's base offense level by up to
four levels.330 This could increase a sentence by up to 125 months in an
adjustment under Section 3CI.1 for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice, the
defendant would still occupy a sentencing range of zero to six months. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §
3C1 .1; U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
325. Obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is sentenced under Section 2J1.2 of the
Guidelines. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. A (Statutory Index). The base offense level for a charge
sentenced under Section 2J 1.2 is twelve. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2J 1.2. The sentencing range for a
defendant with an offense level of twelve and a criminal history category of one is ten to sixteen
months. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
326. United States v. Kurtz, No. 98 CR.733(BSJ), 1999 WL 349374, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,
1999) (stating that the "same operative facts" and "same conduct" could have supported a violation
of either 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) or 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstruction of justice), but noting
that technical differences exist in the elements of each statutory offense).
327. Jonathan H. Hecht, Comment, Airing the Dirty Laundry: The Application of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines to White Collar Money Laundering Offenses, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 289, 311
(1999) ("the money laundering laws are used to prosecute white collar or economic criminals");
Higgins, supra note 323, at 44 (discussing money laundering in the context of fraud offenses, the
author stated that, "[o]ne of the most important uses of [prosecutor] flexibility ... is the prosecutor's
decision about whether to add a money laundering charge").
328. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (7th ed. 1999) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956).
329. See United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 204, 220 (2d Cir. 2002) (the defendant transferred
proceeds of a securities fraud scheme to a certain bank account to conceal the nature and source of
the funds); United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1996) (the defendant transferred
proceeds of a bank fraud scheme to a foreign bank account to conceal the nature and source of the
funds); United States v. Howard, No. CRIM. A. CR. 99-120, 1999 WL 504561, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. July
15, 1999) (the defendant transferred proceeds of a bank fraud and wire fraud scheme to a personal
bank account to conceal the source and nature of the funds).
330. Money laundering charges add from one to four levels to "[t]he offense level for the
underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived." U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §
2S1.1(a); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C, amend. 634 ("As a result of the enhancements
provided by subsections (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B), and (b)(3), all direct money launderers will receive an
offense level that is one to four levels greater than the ... offense level for the underlying offense,
depending on the.., sophistication of the money laundering offense conduct.").
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extreme case. 33' Thus, the potential for sentencing disparity based on a
prosecutor's charging decisions is evident.
Prosecutors have considerable flexibility in arriving at charging
decisions, and variation exists among prosecutors as to how they use that
flexibility.332  Factors that tend to influence a prosecutor's charging
decisions include the prosecutor's general familiarity with applicable
charges, and the availability of prosecutorial resources.333  Not all
prosecutors are familiar with the same charges. Prosecutors more familiar
with certain charges, such as money laundering, are more likely to invoke
those charges. 334  Similarly, prosecutors less familiar with certain charges
are less likely to invoke those charges.335  Further, some United States
Attorney's Offices ("U.S. Attorney's Offices"), typically those in larger
districts, are more specialized than offices in smaller districts. 336 Offices in
larger districts often have entire units devoted solely to particular types of
crimes.337 The specialized knowledge and expertise associated with such
331. For example, a four-level increase in an offense level from thirty-eight to forty-two for a
defendant with a criminal history category of one increases the low end of the sentencing range from
235 months to 360 months. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
332. See Hofer et al., supra note 9, at 260 (acknowledging that prosecutors have discretion in
determining which charges to bring, and that "[u]nless the government exercises its discretion to
bring and press charges and prove facts in a similar way in similar cases, unwarranted sentencing
disparity can easily result"); Higgins, supra note 323, at 44 (noting that "[t]he use of money
laundering charges varies among jurisdictions").
333. Higgins, supra note 323, at 47 (acknowledging that one U.S. Attorney's Office did not begin
to regularly charge money laundering until after the office added a prosecutor who specialized in
money laundering charges); Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree:
The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 143-44 (1990) (stating that prosecutorial
discretion is an area in which "personal and political judgments" influence charging decisions);
Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging Decisions:
Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion - Knowing There Will Be Consequences.for Crossing
the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 378-79 (2000) (acknowledging that strained resources hinder the
ability of prosecutors to investigate and charge certain offenses, and that "a prosecutor must weigh
the evidence in each case and decide how best to expend limited resources based upon the severity
of each [charge] and the probability of convicting the defendant"); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Prosecutorial Discretion. Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 105, 163 (1994) (acknowledging that prosecutor charging decisions are driven by an
efficient allocation of scarce government resources).
334. Higgins, supra note 323, at 47 (discussing the fact that one U.S. Attorney's Office did not
begin to charge money laundering regularly until after the office added a prosecutor who specialized
in money laundering).
335. Id. No money laundering charges were filed in the years before the money laundering
specialist was added to the office. Id.
336. Higgins, supra note 323, at 47 (stating that larger districts often have greater and more
specialized prosecutorial resources).
337. For example, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California has an entire
division, "Major Frauds," devoted primarily to prosecution of fraud and white-collar crime.
Interview with Miriam A. Krinsky, former Chief of Criminal Appeals, United States Attorney's
Office for the Central District of California, Los Angeles, Cal. (Dec. 14, 2001). Also, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida has a special healthcare fraud task force.
514
[Vol.30: 459, 2003] White Collar Crime
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
units increases the likelihood of less common, more complex charges being
brought.3 38 Conversely, offices with strained resources or limited expertise
in a given subject area might be less willing to bring additional or complex
charges that require significant amounts of time to investigate and litigate.33 9
In summary, charging decisions are based on the experience of
individual prosecutors, the specialized expertise available within U.S.
Attorney's Offices, and the prosecutorial resources available within U.S.
Attorney's Offices. As a result of these factors, a white-collar defendant in
one district might face different charges than a similarly situated white-
collar defendant in another district. To the extent that this occurs, and
different sentences are imposed, discretion in charging decisions has a direct
impact on white-collar sentencing disparity.
B. Substantial Assistance to Authorities
Section 5Kl.1 of the Guidelines states that "[u]pon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense, the court may depart [downward] from the guidelines." 340  The
decision of whether to seek a downward departure under Section 5Kl.1 is
left solely to the prosecutor, not the judge.34 1
Downward departures for substantial assistance under Section 5KI.I are
a relatively significant source of white-collar sentencing disparity.342
Substantial assistance departures were granted in approximately seventeen
percent of the 6,286 fraud-related cases sentenced under the Guidelines in
Higgins, supra note 323, at 47.
338. Higgins, supra note 323, at 46-47 (discussing expertise in the areas of money laundering and
healthcare fraud).
339. Id. at 47 (discussing the absence of money laundering charges in a certain U.S. Attorney's
Office before a prosecutor with specialized knowledge of money laundering was brought in); see
also Moore, supra note 333, at 378-79 (acknowledging that strained resources hinder the ability of
prosecutors to investigate and charge certain offenses).
340. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 5K1.I. Departures for substantial assistance represent the majority
of all departures granted under the Guidelines. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at tbl. 27
(indicating that, with respect to fraud-related offenses, there were 1084 "substantial assistance"
departures, 669 "other downward" departures, and 61 "upward" departures granted in the year
2000).
341. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) (stating that a government motion is a
prerequisite to a Section 5K1l downward departure, unless the motion is withheld by the prosecutor
for unconstitutional reasons).
342. See infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text; see also Saris, supra note 27, at 1049 (stating
that "downward departures based on substantial assistance motions are an invitation to unwarranted,
secret sentencing disparity").
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the year 2000. 343  The median departure was ten months.344  Thus, the
significant impact of substantial assistance departures on white-collar
sentencing is evident. An analysis of substantial assistance departures at the
circuit and district level indicates the existence of disparity throughout the
country.
1. Disparity by Geographic Location
Commission data indicates that the relative frequency with which
substantial assistance departures are granted is inconsistent among the
circuits. For example, substantial assistance departures were granted in
thirty-one percent of all fraud-related cases in the Third Circuit in the year
2000. 345 In contrast, substantial assistance departures were granted in just
thirteen percent of all fraud-related cases in the First and Tenth Circuits in
the year 2000.346
The relative frequency with which substantial assistance departures are
granted also varies considerably among districts.3 47  This geographical
343. See supra note 176.
344. See supra note 178.
345. 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 9 (data set for the Third
Circuit). The Third Circuit has consistently led the nation in relative frequency of substantial
assistance departures. Every year from 1996 to 2000, the Third Circuit had a greater ratio of
substantial assistance departures, measured as a percentage of fraud-related cases in the Third
Circuit, than any other circuit. Specifically, the ratio of substantial assistance departures to fraud-
related cases in the Third Circuit was 31%, 27%, 26%, 34%, and 31% for the years 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997, and 1996, respectively. The national average for the same period was 19%, 17%, 15%,
17%, and 16%, respectively. Id.; 1999 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 307, at tbl. 9
(data set for the Third Circuit); 1998 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 308, at tbl. 9
(data set for the Third Circuit); 1997 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 309, at tbl. 9
(data set for the Third Circuit); 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 310, at tbl. 9
(data set for the Third Circuit). The Third Circuit exceeded the next closest circuit by at least six
percent in each of those five years. This was determined by reviewing the individual data sets for
each of the twelve circuits in each of the years from 1996 to 2000. A summary spreadsheet of this
data was prepared by, and is on file with, the author of this Comment. One commentator has
suggested that the high departure frequency in the Third Circuit is the result of prosecutors in at least
one district consistently abusing substantial assistance motions. Frank 0. Bowman III, Departing is
Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "'Substantial Assistance " Departures Follows a
Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 59 (1999) (stating that many
prosecutors in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania use substantial assistance motions as a
"convenient caseload reduction tool").
346. 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 9 (data sets for the First and
Tenth Circuits).
347. Saris, supra note 27, at 1045-46. Judge Saris noted that substantial assistance departures
were granted in forty-eight percent of cases sentenced in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
only seven percent of cases sentenced in the Central District of California in the year 1996. Id. The
ratios have not materially changed from 1996 to 2000. In the year 2000, substantial assistance
departures were granted in thirty-seven percent of cases sentenced in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and only thirteen percent of cases sentenced in the Central District of California. 2000
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 8. Judge Saris also stated that:
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analysis reveals that disparity with respect to substantial assistance
departures indeed exists. However, the reasons for the disparity lie beneath
a circuit-level or district-level analysis.
2. Reasons for Disparity
A commonly cited reason to explain differences in the frequency with
which substantial assistance departures are granted is that requirements for
receiving a substantial assistance departure are different among U.S.
Attorney's Offices. 3 48 This is because each U.S. Attorney's Office is
allowed to establish its own substantial assistance policy. One commentator,
a federal district court judge, has noted that "there are no national
Department of Justice guidelines governing either the amount of substantial
assistance necessary to trigger a section 5K1.1 motion, or the degree of a
downward departure to recommend.,
349
Policies in most U.S. Attorney's Offices state that defendants who either
testify against other individuals, or provide information leading to the
prosecution of other individuals, qualify for a substantial assistance
departure. 350 However, several inconsistent policies among U.S. Attorney's
Offices have been shown to exist. For example, despite the fact that the
Guidelines only permit a substantial assistance departure for information
pertaining to the prosecution of individuals other than the defendant,35'
The rate of downward departures based on substantial assistance varies dramatically from
district to district, depending on the law enforcement practices of the United States
Attorney.... The statistics suggest that in some districts, the use of substantial assistance
motions is viewed as a key law enforcement tool, while in others it is not.
Saris, supra note 27, at 1045-46.
348. E.g., LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL
POLICY AND PRACTICE 7, 9 (1998) (noting that each U.S. Attorney's Office is allowed to establish
its own Section 5K1.1 policy, and that results from a study conducted in 1995 indicate that there is
"a lack of coordinated policies and benchmarks in the U.S. attorney's offices to guide decision
making as to when a defendant qualifies for a substantial assistance departure motion"); Bowman,
supra note 345, at 61, 67 (noting that "[d]efendants in District A may very well receive different
sentences than identically situated defendants in District B because of differing local substantial
assistance practices," and concluding that there are "dramatic disparities in substantial assistance
practices between U.S. Attorneys' Offices").
349. Saris, supra note 27, at 1046.
350. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 348, at 8 (presenting findings from a study conducted in
1995). As reported in the study, of ninety-four U.S. Attorney's Offices sampled, all were willing to
consider substantial assistance departures for offenders who testified against other individuals, and
ninety-nine percent of the offices were willing to consider departures for defendants who provided
information leading to the prosecution of others. Id. at 7 n. 17, 8, and ex.4.
351. Supra note 170 and accompanying text (quoting text from Section 5K1.1).
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approximately one-half of the U.S. Attorney's Offices throughout the
country are willing to request a substantial assistance departure when the
defendant provides information pertaining to the defendant's own
prosecution.352 Further, while some offices are willing to request a
substantial assistance departure based on information that merely confirms
existing information known by prosecutors, other offices require new
information not previously known by prosecutors.353 In addition, while
some offices require that information provided by the defendant lead to the
arrest of another individual, other offices are willing to request a downward
departure absent an arrest.
354
Even when consistent substantial assistance policies are adopted among
U.S. Attorney's Offices, prosecutors sometimes diverge from the policies.
355
For example, a Commission study conducted in 1995 suggested that
substantial assistance policies, and supervisory review policies with regard
to substantial assistance practices, were disregarded in approximately sixteen
percent of all U.S. Attorney's Offices.356 When prosecutors diverge from
formal policies, the result is that similarly situated defendants prosecuted by
different prosecutors might receive different sentences depending on which
prosecutor prosecuted the case, rather than on the degree or type of
substantial assistance provided. 357 As a consequence, significant sentencing
disparity could occur.
352. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 348, at 9. The authors stated:
The U.S. attorneys split almost evenly over whether [infonnation a defendant provides
about his or her own criminal behavior] would be considered in making a §5KI. I motion;
just under half of the districts (48.9 %) used self-incriminating information in considering
substantial assistance. This ... suggests that, depending upon the sentencing jurisdiction,
one defendant may receive a sentence reduction for such behavior, while a similarly
situated defendant in another district would not.
Id.
353. Higgins, supra note 323, at 45 ("Sometimes telling everything you know is good enough. In
other cases, that information must be truly new information, not merely confirming what
investigators already know. 'You must always check with the district you are practicing in to see
what the policy is .... ') (quoting Rebekah Poston, a former federal prosecutor).
354. Saris, supra note 27, at 1049 ("In some districts ... an arrest must actually result. In another
district, .... a motion should be filed if a defendant 'does everything he is called upon to do,' without
focusing entirely on 'results."').
355. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 348, at 8 (stating that "districts frequently diverged from
their stated [substantial assistance] policy").
356. Id.
357. Id. at 9 (noting that, due to inconsistent substantial assistance policies, one defendant might
receive a sentencing reduction for certain behavior while a similarly situated defendant engaging in
similar behavior might not receive a sentencing reduction).
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3. Disparity Caused by Prosecutors Rather than Judges
Most circuits have held that once the prosecutor submits a motion for a
substantial assistance departure, the decision of whether to depart from the
applicable sentencing range is left to the court.358  As a practical matter,
judges grant the vast majority of motions sought by prosecutors.359
Therefore, disparity between the relative frequencies with which substantial
assistance departures are granted is primarily explained by prosecutorial
discretion rather than judicial discretion.3
60
4. Summary of Disparity Related to Substantial Assistance Departures
Defendants in white-collar crime cases provide substantial assistance to
authorities rather frequently, triggering downward departures under Section
5Ki. 1.36 1 The frequency with which prosecutors seek substantial assistance
departures varies from circuit to circuit and district to district.362  The
variance in frequency is caused in large part by the fact that different U.S.
Attorney's Offices have established different internal policies regarding the
type of conduct that qualifies for a substantial assistance departure. 363  In
addition to variant substantial assistance policies, prosecutors sometimes
diverge from the policies established in their offices.364 As a result of
variant policies, and divergence from those policies, two similarly situated
defendants providing similar assistance to authorities but prosecuted by
different prosecutors might be subjected to different departure outcomes. 365
Accordingly, significant sentencing disparity could occur.366
358. WOOD, supra note 40, at 440-41 (collecting cases).
359. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 348, at 5 n.l I (stating that "information obtained by the
Commission indicates that the vast majority of motions are granted as a matter of course").
360. Although the prosecutor determines whether to seek a Section 5KI.1 motion for departure,
the judge determines the length of the departure. See Saris, supra note 27, at 1049 (discussing
departures for substantial assistance, Judge Saris stated that "as a practical matter, a sentencing court
has unfettered discretion in determining the extent of downward departures"). Judicial discretion
with regard to departure length indeed leads to sentencing disparity. See supra notes 261-69 and
accompanying text (discussing departures generally, not just departures for substantial assistance).
Thus, judicial discretion does to some extent contribute to sentencing disparity in the context of
downward departures for substantial assistance.
361. See supra note 176 (noting that substantial assistance departures were granted in seventeen
percent of all fraud-related cases in the year 2000).
362. See supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 348-54 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
366. Saris, supra note 27, at 1049.
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C. Plea Agreements
Plea agreements are another source of white-collar sentencing disparity
related to prosecutorial discretion. Plea agreements were reached in
approximately ninety-six percent of all fraud-related cases sentenced under
the Guidelines in the year 2000.367 Thus, plea agreements play an important
role in white-collar sentencing.368 Plea agreements are beneficial to
defendants because they usually result in a lesser sentence.369 In this respect,
inconsistencies in the manner in which plea agreements are arrived at, or the
extent of sentencing reductions offered by prosecutors to white-collar
defendants, constitute a source of white-collar sentencing disparity.
1. Disparity Among Circuits
Commission data indicates that inconsistencies exist among the circuits
in the relative frequency with which plea agreements are reached. For
example, plea agreements were reached in approximately ninety-seven
percent of all fraud-related cases in the Third Circuit in the year 2000.3 70 In
contrast, plea agreements were reached in just ninety-three percent of all
fraud-related cases in the Second Circuit in the year 2000. 37 1 Further, every
In short, downward departures based on substantial assistance motions are an invitation
to unwarranted, secret sentencing disparity .... With respect to cooperating individuals,
there is little assurance that a [defendant] in New Hampshire will receive the same
sentence as one in Rhode Island, or that even among cooperating defendants who are
similarly situated and cooperate in similar ways, that the sentences will be uniform.
Id.
367. 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 3 (indicating that there were
5,997 plea agreements reached in 6,278 fraud-related cases in the year 2000).
368. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention And Its Dynamics In The Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1284, 1296 (1997) (stating that "[plea bargaining] policies are an important part of the
environment in which the Guidelines operate, and they contribute significantly to sentencing
disparity"). The Guidelines discuss plea agreements only briefly. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, §§
6B 1. 1 - 6B 1.4 (addressing general plea agreement procedures).
369. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 368, at 1290 (estimating, based on case reviews and
interviews in ten federal court districts, that in approximately twenty to thirty-five percent of cases
resolved by plea agreements the sentence imposed is less than that required by strict application of
the guidelines); Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin Jr., 'Queen For a Day' or 'Courtesan for a
Day': The Sixth Amendment Limits to Proffer Agreements, 15 No. 9 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
REPORTER 1, sec. B (Oct. 2001) (acknowledging that as part of the plea bargain process prosecutors
often agree to drop one or more charges in exchange for a plea of guilty to other charges).
370. 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Third
Circuit). There were 448 plea agreements reached in 462 fraud-related cases in the Third Circuit in
the year 2000. Id. The resulting ratio of plea agreements to fraud-related cases was ninety-seven
percent. Id. The Third Circuit had the highest ratio of all circuits. Id. (per review of individual data
sets for all twelve circuits).
371. 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Second
Circuit). There were 753 plea agreements reached in 812 fraud-related cases in the Second Circuit
in the year 2000. Id. The resulting ratio of plea agreements to fraud-related cases was ninety-three
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year from 1996 to 2000, the Seventh Circuit had a lower ratio of plea
agreements in fraud-related cases, measured as a percentage of total fraud-
related cases in the Seventh Circuit, than the national average. 312  This
circuit-level analysis reveals that disparity with respect to plea agreements
indeed exists. However, the reasons for disparity lie beneath a circuit-level
analysis.
2. Reasons for Disparity
There are at least two reasons for disparity in the relative frequency with
which plea agreements are reached throughout the country. First, different
U.S. Attorney's Offices have established different internal policies regarding
the manner in which plea agreements will be struck.373 A subset of this is
the fact that different U.S. Attorney's Offices have established different
review procedures regarding the manner in which supervisory personnel will
review plea agreements for compliance with office policy.37 4  Second,
different U.S. Attorney's Offices have different prosecutorial resources from
which to draw when determining whether to litigate a case. 375  The
availability of prosecutorial resources directly impacts the prosecutor's
decision of whether to enter into a plea agreement.
percent. Id. The Second Circuit had the lowest ratio of all circuits. Id. (per review of individual
data sets for all twelve circuits).
372. Specifically, the ratio of plea agreements in fraud-related cases, measured as a percentage of
total fraud-related cases in the Seventh Circuit, was 95.3%, 94.2%, 93.0%, 92.1%, and 91.0% for the
years 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, and 1996, respectively. The ratio of plea agreements in fraud-related
cases, measured as a percentage total fraud-related cases on a national level, was 95.5%, 95.1%,
94.4%, 94.1%, and 93.1% for the years 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, and 1996, respectively. 2000
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 306, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Seventh Circuit); 1999
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 307, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Seventh Circuit); 1998
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 308, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Seventh Circuit); 1997
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 309, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Seventh Circuit); 1996
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 310, at tbl. 3 (data set for the Seventh Circuit). The
Seventh Circuit was the only circuit to have had a ratio below the national average in each year from
1996 to 2000. This was determined by reviewing the individual data sets for each of the twelve
circuits in each of the years from 1996 to 2000. A summary spreadsheet of this data was prepared
by, and is on file with, the author of this Comment.
373. See infra notes 376-81 and accompanying text.
374. See infra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
375. See infra notes 386-92 and accompanying text.
i. Differing Internal Policies
Each U.S. Attorney's Office typically establishes its own internal
policies regarding the plea bargaining process.376 These policies are a
significant determinant of the circumstances under which plea bargains are
offered.377 To the extent that plea bargain policies differ from one U.S.
Attorney's Office to another, sentencing disparity may result.
3 78
To illustrate, one U.S. Attorney's Office might adopt a formal, rigid
policy regarding the offer of plea agreements to first time offenders, while
another U.S. Attorney's Office might adopt an informal, flexible policy
regarding the offer of plea agreements to first time offenders. 379 The formal,
rigid policy might strictly require prosecutors to offer a plea agreement to all
first time offenders, regardless of the offender's true criminal past. The
informal, flexible policy might provide prosecutors with discretion to
withhold a plea agreement when the first time offender has a checkered but
technically conviction-free past. Sentencing disparity could result from
these inconsistent policies.
For example, suppose a defendant was indicted for involvement in a
fraud scheme. Suppose also that the defendant was charged for a similar
crime several months earlier, but the charges were dismissed because critical
evidence was suppressed. 8 In the U.S. Attorney's Office with a formal,
rigid policy, the prosecutor would be obligated to offer a plea agreement to
the defendant because the defendant was technically a first time offender.
However, in the U.S. Attorney's Office with an informal, flexible policy, the
prosecutor would have discretion to decline to offer a plea agreement
because the defendant, although technically a first time offender, was known
to be involved in prior criminal conduct. 38' To the extent that the plea
agreement would result in a reduced sentence, sentencing disparity would
occur as a result of the inconsistency in office policies. A defendant
376. William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1344-45
(1993) (recognizing that plea bargaining policies vary from one U.S. Attorney's Office to another,
and recommending that each U.S. Attorney's Office adopt at least a system of informal controls over
plea bargaining decisions).
377. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.5(h) n.458 (2d ed. 1999) (stating
that "internal guidelines of prosecutors' offices continue[] as the primary regulator of discretion as to
whether to plea bargain and as to what concessions should be offered").
378. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 368, at 1296 (stating that "[plea bargaining] policies are an
important part of the environment in which the Guidelines operate, and they contribute significantly
to sentencing disparity"); see also infra note 397.
379. See Pizzi, supra note 377, at 1365 (noting that some U.S. Attorney's Offices are reluctant to
adopt formal published guidelines regarding plea bargaining because formal policies restrict
flexibility).
380. See id. (discussing suppression of evidence of a defendant's drug use).
381. Id.
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prosecuted in a district subject to the formal, rigid policy would receive a
lesser sentence than a similarly situated defendant prosecuted in a district
subject to the informal, flexible policy.
Sentencing disparity also results from the fact that different U.S.
Attorney's Offices establish different review procedures regarding the
manner in which supervisory personnel review prosecutors' plea
agreements.382 Lack of supervision may lead to sentencing disparity because
a prosecutor's unfamiliarity with the Guidelines during plea negotiations can
cause inadvertent variances in sentencing.3  For example, a prosecutor
might dismiss several seemingly insignificant fraud-related charges against a
defendant who is charged with several other significant fraud charges,
without realizing that such actions affect the calculation of the overall
sentence.38 4 Without adequate supervision, this oversight could cause the
defendant to receive a significantly lower sentence than the defendant would
have received if more strict supervisory procedures were in place with
respect to the plea agreement.38 5
ii. Differing Prosecutorial Resources
Availability of prosecutorial resources also has an impact on the
frequency with which plea agreements are reached. For example, U.S.
Attorney's Offices with sufficient prosecutorial resources to handle the
workload required for high numbers of trials might be less willing to accept
plea agreements.38 6 In contrast, U.S. Attorney's Offices with strained
382. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 368, at 1295. Of the ten U.S. Attorney's Offices included in
the authors' study, the authors found that only one office established a formal supervisory committee
charged with reviewing plea agreements. Id. at 1284, 1295. The authors also noted that "offices in
two [of the ten] districts expressly reject the notion of supervisory review, insisting that line
attorneys produce better results if they are entrusted with unfettered discretion . I..." Id. at 1295.
Further, "[i]n most offices, the idea of supervisory review is accepted in principle, but only a few...
districts seriously implement it." Id. The authors concluded by stating:
[Supervisory] policies [regarding plea bargaining] are an important part of the
environment in which the Guidelines operate, and they contribute significantly to
sentencing disparity. Because supervisory control is on the whole relatively lax,
Guidelines evasion continues to occur. Because the degree of supervisory control varies
greatly from district to district, the degree of Guidelines evasion also varies greatly.
Id. at 1296.
383. Id. at 1294 (discussing the effect of supervisory review of plea agreements on sentencing
disparity).
384. Id. (phrasing the analysis in terms of bank robbery charges).
385. Id.
386. Higgins, supra note 323, at 47 (acknowledging that prosecutorial resources vary among U.S.
Attorney's Offices and that smaller, low-volume districts can often afford to decline plea agreements
prosecutorial resources might be more willing to accept plea agreements in
order to avoid lengthy litigation. The result of differing prosecutorial
resources is that defendants might have a greater or lesser chance to enter
into plea agreements and receive lesser sentences depending on the
jurisdiction in which they are prosecuted.
The United States Department of Justice publishes the United States
Attorneys' Manual ("Manual"), which establishes general principles
governing plea agreements.387 Prosecutors sometimes disregard the Manual,
or apply its provisions differently than other prosecutors.388 Disregard for,
or inconsistent application of, the Manual could be caused in part by strained
prosecutorial resources and a prosecutor's related desire to avoid trial by
entering into a plea agreement.389 To the extent that variances in resources
lead to variances in the application of the Manual, which in turn lead to
inconsistent plea agreement practices, sentencing disparity may result.
To illustrate, the Manual states that after an indictment has been filed a
prosecutor should only dismiss a charge if, "as a result of a change in the
evidence," the prosecutor in good faith determines that the charge is not
readily provable by the current evidence. 390 This provision has been known
to lead to sentencing disparity.391 For example, some prosecutors wishing to
avoid trial, or to litigate fewer charges after filing an indictment, might claim
a lack of evidence for one or more of the charges even though sufficient
evidence in fact exists.392 The result is that the defendant will face fewer
because of a greater availability of resources with which to prosecute); Schulhofer & Nagel, supra
note 368, at 1296 (stating that "office resources prompt some prosecutors to attempt to resolve some
cases quickly, just to get them off their desks so that they can devote more time and attention to
matters believed to be more important").
387. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (2002) [hereinafter U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_
room/usam/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with author); Saris, supra note 27, at 1056
(discussing the U.S. Attorney's Manual in the context of plea bargaining).
388. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469,
486-87 (1996) (acknowledging that "disregard of the United States Attorneys' Manual" by federal
prosecutors indeed occurs).
389. See Saris, supra note 27, at 1056 n.150 (acknowledging that prosecutors may attempt to
bypass the U.S. Attorney's Manual because of pressures from an "overwhelming case load").
390. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 387, § 9-27.400(B), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.400 (last visited Oct. 15, 2002)
(on file with author).
391. Saris, supra note 27, at 1056. "In practice... AUSAs generally have broad discretion to
decide whether a charge is 'readily provable'...." Id. The result of using prosecutorial discretion
to stretch the provisions of the U.S. Attorney's manual "is that similarly situated defendants will
receive different treatment, depending on the AUSA they draw." Id.
392. Id. "Many... judges have suggested that AUSAs hide their decisions to dismiss charges
under cover of a claimed lack of proof, when in fact other reasons animate their actions." Id.
This is not to suggest that prosecutors have evil motives in dismissing charges, but rather
that they have varied motives: general sympathy for a defendant; recognition that the case
is atypical for some reason; an overwhelming case load; a belief that the mandatory
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charges and likely a lesser sentence. To the extent that a different prosecutor
would not have engaged in such trial tactics, sentencing disparity will occur.
3. Summary of Disparity Related to Plea Agreements
Defendants of white-collar crimes enter into plea agreements rather
frequently. 3 93  However, the frequency with which plea agreements are
entered into varies from circuit to circuit.394 The variance is caused in large
part by the fact that different U.S. Attorney's Offices have established
different internal policies regarding the plea bargaining process.395 In
addition, differences in prosecutorial resources among U.S. Attorney's
Offices impact the likelihood of whether a prosecutor will be inclined to
enter into a plea agreement. 396 As a result of these differences in policies
and prosecutorial resources, two similarly situated white-collar defendants
charged by different prosecutors might not receive similar plea agreements.
To the extent that plea agreements result in decreased sentences, which
usually occur, the plea bargaining process presents a significant source of
white-collar sentencing disparity.
397
VII. CONCLUSION
Among the Commission's primary goals is to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparity among defendants with similar records who have
engaged in similar misconduct.39 This Comment has identified several
sources of white-collar sentencing disparity that run counter to the
Commission's goal of reducing disparity.
A review of decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals reveals at
least twelve distinct splits of authority that lead to white-collar sentencing
sentence is too high; the need to protect a witness; or many other reasons.
Id. at n.150.
393. Supra note 367 and accompanying text (noting that plea agreements were reached in
approximately ninety-six percent of all fraud-related cases in the year 2000).
394. Supra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
395. Supra notes 376-85 and accompanying text.
396. Supra notes 386-92 and accompanying text.
397. Saris, supra note 27, at 1055 ("Large majorities of district judges... somewhat or strongly
agree with the statement that 'plea bargains are a source of hidden unwarranted disparity in the
guidelines system."') (quoting Molly Treadway Johnson & Scott A. Gilbert, FED. JUD. CTR., THE
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S SURVEY
6 (1996), 13 tbl. 7).
398. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
disparity. 399 The Commission has been designated as the primary entity
responsible for resolving splits of authority regarding interpretation and
application of the Guidelines.400  Amendments to the Guidelines, which
occur every year, serve as the primary mode for addressing sentencing-
related splits of authority among the courts.40' It is recommended that the
Commission review the splits of authority identified in this Comment and
amend the Guidelines with clarifying language to resolve conflicting
authority. This Comment does not propose a particular resolution of the
substantive issues underlying each split of authority. Rather, it is merely
recommended that the Commission address the splits of authority so as to
eliminate the outstanding sources of sentencing disparity.
Other sources of white-collar sentencing disparity include the fact-
intensive "adjustments" and "departures" established under the
Guidelines. 40 2 As a result of the abuse of discretion standard of appellate
review, sentencing judges have significant discretion in deciding whether
adjustments should be imposed in a given case, and whether and to what
extent departures should be imposed in a given case.403  However, to the
extent that different judges weigh facts differently, or apply the Guidelines
to the facts in different ways, unwarranted sentencing disparity often
occurs.
40 4 In this respect, adjustments and departures are a source of white-
collar sentencing disparity.
Further sources of white-collar sentencing disparity include the
discretion held by judges to: (i) select a sentence within the sentencing
range;4 5 and (ii) substitute part of a defendant's sentence with non-prison
alternatives.40 6 Due to the discretionary nature of sentencing in these areas,
unwarranted sentencing disparity often occurs. The result of the judicial
discretion is that, in substantially similar cases, different judges might arrive
at significantly different decisions regarding which point to select within a
sentencing range and which non-prison alternatives, if any, to impose.
A final source of white-collar sentencing disparity identified in this
Comment is the discretion held by prosecutors in determining: (i) which
charges to bring;407 (ii) whether to seek a downward departure for substantial
assistance provided to authorities;40 8 and (iii) whether to enter into a plea
399. See supra Part I[I.A.
400. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part V.B., C.
403. See supra Part IV.A.
404. See supra notes 212, 235 and accompanying text.
405. See supra Part V.A.
406. See supra Part V.B.
407. See supra Part VIA.
408. See supra Part VI.B.
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agreement.40 9 A risk of sentencing disparity exists in these areas because not
all prosecutors exercise their prosecutorial discretion in the same manner.
As a result, two similarly situated defendants prosecuted for identical crimes
by different prosecutors might receive significantly different sentences.
The goal of this Comment was to identify sources of white-collar
sentencing disparity. It was not a goal to determine how to remedy the
identified disparity. Nevertheless, the remedy issue is worthy of at least a
passing remark. A recommendation for resolving the splits of authority
among the courts of appeals is stated above. Regarding the discretion held
by judges and prosecutors, commentators have suggested that the virtues of
judicial and prosecutorial discretion tend to outweigh the vices.41 0
Therefore, remedial measures do not appear to be needed with respect to
discretionary sentencing practices exercised by judges and prosecutors under
the Guidelines.
Jon J. Lambiras
411
409. See supra Part VI.C.
410. See Cory, supra note 9, at 437 (2002) (concluding that in the context of a judge's sentencing
discretion under the Guidelines, some resulting sentencing disparity is tolerable and need not be
completely eliminated; "[blearing in mind that abuse of discretion cannot be eliminated without also
eliminating use of discretion, I believe ... that the virtues ofjudicial sentencing discretion outweigh
the vices"); Saris, supra note 27, at 1062 (concluding that in the context of a prosecutor's discretion
in the plea bargaining process, some resulting sentencing disparity is tolerable and need not be
completely eliminated; "[t]o the extent plea bargaining does create some unwarranted [sentencing]
disparity in a minority of the cases, any statutory 'solution' (like abolishing plea bargaining or
making the probation officers fact finders) would be worse than the problem"); Schulhofer & Nagel,
supra note 368, at 1295-96 (concluding that in the context of a prosecutor's discretion in the plea
bargaining process, some resulting sentencing disparity is tolerable and need not be completely
eliminated).
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